INVESTIGATING MEDIA DISCOURSE OF RADICALIZATION AMONG INDONESIAN YOUTH: A PRELIMINARY RESEARCH

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Abstract: Indonesia has the biggest Muslim population in the world. Indonesian Muslims see themselves as 'moderate Muslims' compared to the others in the world. Some Indonesianists shared this view almost without sufficient criticism especially during the New Order era in 1960s-1990's. However, things have changed over time and it has turned out that recently some experts in the field have shown their disapproval on this issue. After elect President Joko Widodo is in power, Indonesians have been divided into two broad opposing positions as claimed by moderate Muslims. The administration of President Joko Widodo and his political party, Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) hold the claim of moderate Muslims who keep loyal to the present secular political system while their political rivals who mainly come from what Indonesian mainstream media have constructed as 'intolerant and radical Muslims' with the diametrically opposing position. According to the last party, Indonesian Muslims have to be more hostile to any non-Muslim countries and moreover, they require the change of secular political system in Indonesia to Islamic political system (Khilafah Islamiyah).The present study aims at researching the current debate and news media discourse between what it is called Muslim Nusantara particularly represented by two Indonesian largest non-government Islamic organizations, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah and those constructed as 'intolerant and radical Muslims'. Particularly this study will focus on the mainstream media discourse on the engagement of young Muslim students with some perceived radical organizations. The findings of a public survey published recently state that around 25% of Indonesian Muslim students support the change of Indonesia's political system from the existing secular political system to Islamic political system (Khilafah). In this matter, this study will use Critical Discourse Analysis as the research method. The qualitative data will apply ethnographic methods particularly in-depth interviews and participant observation in some big cities in Java, the most populated island in Indonesia where Muslim students are greatly seen in great number. Prominent public figures from Islamic and other religious communities, political scientists and the government

officials will be interviewed. Moreover, the secondary data in a kind of archive data will be gathered as well. Finally, the documentary film of the aforementioned research will be presented to supplement the textual analysis.

Keywords: Radicalization, Youth, Indonesian, Media Discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis

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Introduction

Radicalization discourse on Indonesian Islamic youth has been a relatively long story. It can be traced back to the early era of the Indonesian New Order government. According to Syamsuddin Aziz (personal interview, 2018), the senior communication scholar from Hasanuddin University, Makassar, Indonesia, there are at least two important eras of Islamic student movement in Indonesia. Aziz argued that the different point view occurred when Education Minister Daud Jusuf dissolved the intra-campus student organizations, the university student councils and the implementation of NKK (Normalises Kehidupan Kampus/Normalizing Campus Life/BKK (Badan Koordinasi Kampus/Student Coordinating Body), the policy introduced in 1979 that reorganized the student representative bodies after the student councils were closed in 1978. It was implemented when it would restore the normality of university life. When implementing the NKK/BKK program Daud Jusuf copied the ideal campus life from Western European countries at that time. He said that the campuses in Indonesia had been "tainted" with practical political forces in the era and so, it had to be normalized.

The paradigm line of the student movements based on the two eras at above is quite different: The influence of practical political forces to the student movement was very strong before 1978, and after that year the influence was slowly weakening. According to Syamsuddin Aziz (personal interview, 1978), it occurred due to the direct influence of the NKK/BKK policy. One main target of the policy was the abolition of the Student Council (Dewan Mahasiswa/DEMA), the most influential student executive organization. For several years after 1978, the intra-campus organizations were almost never heard. The student senate was the only one organization allowed in the level of faculty. The movement was not as free as the era of the Student Council (DEMA). The existence of the student senate organization only met the requirements of the organizational structure set by DIKTI (Direktorat Pendidikan Tinggi/Directorate General of Higher Education, Ministry of Research and Higher Education, Indonesia). However, the essence of student movement did not appear in the organization. Under such circumstances, student activists chose alternative organizations and they established study groups colouring student life in almost all universities. Therefore, the student organizations established to accommodate student movements at the level actually had been transformed into scientific forums to meet the political arrogance for students in the level of campus. Most of the student activists also actively preferred some extracurricular organizations, like HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic Student Association), PMII, and IMM for the Muslim students and PMKRI and GMKI for non-Muslim students. These organizations were actively engaged in the inspiration of basic patriotism values and leadership exercises. These extracurricular student organizations actually had colored the academic life of the campus until around 1997.

The policy of sole ideology under the Suharto regime for all social organizations had the main objective for Islamic students and their organizations. The organizations without school base will slowly dim. Students and their organizations that had school base could carry out their activities. As the student organization that the Suharto regime greatly feared, finally

HMI split into two groups: The first could adopt the sole ideology policy; the second one that called themselves HMI MPO (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi/The Council of the Organizational Rescuers) definitely rejected the policy. All hardliners joined the HMI MPOs and those who recognized the policy would join HMI (non-MPO). Hereinafter, the researchers would call it HMI. This policy triggered very sharp friction in the HMI organization.

If we see from the viewpoint of literacy practice, the HMI organization does not refuse secular readings. The notion of "Islam Yes Islamic Parties No" from Nurcholis Majid strongly influences their reading. Despite the HMI MPO (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi/The council of the Organizational Rescuers) prefer the reading of known Islamic mujahid movement in the Islamic world. For example, the thought of Hasan al-Banna is very influential in the group. Despite some members of the group criticize the obligation of Muslim to be active in the political movement. Other members of the group even break away and forbid the secular reading material (antitheses of Nurcholis Majid's thought).

If ROHIS, the extracurricular activities of junior and senior high school students in Islamic Spirituality activities, is claimed to teach radicalism from the government's viewpoint, it is necessary to carry serious researches on the origin of the radical thinking. It is definitely obvious that students and their organizations cannot have role to mobilize the groups (personal interview with Syamsuddin Aziz, 2018). The inactive role of students and their organizations to conducting leadership and organizational training in the level of school because the materials of leadership and organization increasingly become common while their access to the past materials is limited and it is under the possession of activists who undergo various levels of leadership training. For example, Islamic student organizations have the level of instructor education but it is very strict. As the instructors of the organizations they have to undergo a series of screenings to ensure their organizational commitment and secrecy. Therefore, we can state that materials taught and developed in ROHIS do not come from the Islamic student organization mentioned at above. It is definitely possible that general materials such as meeting and rhetoric methods and other organizational materials can be imitated from the aforementioned Islamic student organizations. Moreover, it is possible because in the beginning of the establishment, instructors and speakers come from the activists. Some teachers are former activists who have been taught on the basic level materials (basic training). However, what has been taught in ROHIS does not have any ideological connection with the Islamic students and their organizations as discussed earlier.

It is not deniable that what has happened to the Islamic student organizations internally strongly gets influence from the dynamics of political practices in society. Some training materials developed in the organizations internally are actually an attempt to answer the dynamics. In fact, the answers are typical solutions from activists who stand outside the regime at that time. Moreover, the emergence of radical understanding as expressed by the government is methodically didactic and it is not a means of creating organizational cadres who are capable to make critical thinking and have high commitment and militancy to fighting for people's aspirations. This loss of spirit indicates the loss of basic nature for Islamic student movements. However, it remains in the context of thought and debate which occasionally appears reaction for their militantcy.

Literature Review

Some journalists and politicians have a propensity to create a Moderate Islam-Extremist Islam dichotomy (Alatas, 2003). This way of thinking, according to Alatas (2003) does not have verifiable credentials and tends to operate in influencing the public that moderate and, by extension, less strict Muslims are good Muslims and at the same time that extremist and, therefore, stricter Muslims are bad Muslims. Following the 9/11incident, the then United States President George W Bush Jr distinguished between ‗bad Muslim' and ‗ good Muslim' in a relatively simple definition: ―bad Muslims' were viewed responsible for terrorism acts, while at the same time ―good Muslims‖ would be those who would openly condemn these attacks and support his well-known global war on terrorism's motto ‗with us' in a war against ‗them' (Mamdani, 2003). For Mamdani (2003), this displays the critical message of such discourse: unless proved to be ―good‖, every Muslim was presumed to be ‗bad'. This same public debate on Moderate Islam versus extremist Islam continues to take place around the world, including in country like Indonesia.

Mass media play an important role in the creation and distribution of ideologies (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016) and thereby contribute to the overall cultural production of knowledge (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016) argued that the stories and images in the media provide resources (symbols) through which we organize a common culture and through the appropriation of which we insert ourselves into that culture. Numerous studies have shown mass media to articulate dominant social values, ideologies and developments, and that these characteristics often lead to misrepresentation of stereotypical portrayals of minorities in the media (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016).

Indonesian journalists view themselves unique in the way that they embrace a special press philosophy– Pancasila Press (Development press) – as the elements of responsible and ethical conduct that separate the Indonesian press from that of Western societies (Romano, 2003). During the New Order, the ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia defined the liberal watchdog, fourth-estate press system as culturally improper, preserving that a consensus-oriented press was more philosophically appropriate (Forum Keadilan Magazine, cited in Romano, 2003). They defined themselves as ―ours is not a watchdog press in the Western fashion. A watchdog must stand guard outside the house. We prefer to keep our press inside along with the rest of the family‖ (Asia Watch,1988, as cited in Romano, 2003). In other words, Pancasila press as defined by the New Order Indonesia did not operate outside the system monitoring and checking as well as scrutinizing the system but they were responsible within the system to develop the nation as a whole in all fields (Sinaga, 1987, as cited in Romano, 2003). The current Indonesian press post Reform system still embrace a relatively the same characteristic with the emphasis on the nation-building role paradigm (Romano, 2003).

The current image of Indonesian Islam, according to Hamdani (2015), has been marked by unfriendly and intolerant acts in responding to social and political realities. In its opinion section, the Jakarta Post claims that such acts of violence have often been perpetrated by hard-line Muslim groups, such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Gerakan Reformasi Islam (Garis) and other similar organisations (Hamdani, 2015). This deplorable trend, as discussed previously, is one of the features of liberalisation following the fall of the New Order regime.

A short video sparked hot conversation on social media in April 2017. The short video featured hundreds of students to uphold Islamic political system (Khilafah) and Islamic laws in Indonesia. Quoting the Dissemination of Research Results on "Islamic Literature of Millennium Generation" conducted by Post-graduate Program of UIN Sunan Kalijaga-Puspidep in cooperation with PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia and ISNU, it is reported that the activity organized by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) takes place in a leading campus, i.e. IPB (Bogor Agriculture University). The research report further explains that studies show the massive influence of the Islamic movement among Muslim students in campuses, and it has occurred since the late of 1970s. This activity is reported to have begun in the campus of ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung/Bandung Institute of Technology). Moreover, the movement spreads to various campuses throughout Indonesia via LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/Campus Organization for Dawah) and it gets support from DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/ Indonesian Islamic Dawah Council) (Hefner, 2000, Damanik 2003, Hasan 2006, Aziz 2006, Karim 2006, Rosyad 2006 quoted from PPS UIN Sunan Kalijaga et al 2017). The above study also mentions that the Islamist movement also penetrates Senior High School (SMA) and Junior High School (SMP) through ROHIS. According to the findings of UIN Sunan Kalijaga et al having been reviewed at above, Islamic ideology slips and spreads its influence through this way.

If we review again, there are other data from LIPI's findings and it is no less surprising. According to LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/ Indonesian Institute of Science), Indonesian youth is ideologically radicalized and increasingly intolerant while many universities are under the control of hardline groups (*BBC Indonesia*, February 18, 2016). According to the LIPI's researcher Anas Said, the radicalism idea occurs because the Islamization process carried out among young people occurs closely and it tends not to open to other Islamic viewpoints particularly those who have different beliefs (non-Muslims). Anas revealed that from a study conducted in 2011 there were five leading universities in Indonesia, i.e. Gadjah Mada University (UGM), University of Indonesia (UI), Bogor Agriculture University (IPM), Airlangga University (Unair) and Diponegoro University (UNDIP) that showed the increase of conservative understanding or religious fundamentalism particularly among university/non-religious college students. The increasing trend of fundamentalism understanding occurs continuously until right now. Another researcher from LIPI, Endang Turmudi who quoted a survey conducted by The Pew Research Center, USA in 2015 stated that there were about 4% or 10 million Indonesians who supported ISIS and most of the numbers came from young people.

LaKIP (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian/Institute for Islamic and Peace Studies) led by Bambang Pranowo, Professor of Islamic Sociology at UIN Jakarta (State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta) reports a more surprising data. A survey on radicalism conducted in 100 senior high schools in Greater Jakarta and surrounding areas shows that nearly 50% of students support hardline ways in dealing with morality and religious conflict (*BBC Indonesia online*, April 26, 2011). In the survey, LaKIP distributes a questionnaire to 1000 students. It also conducts a pool of Islamic religious teachers in public schools (non-religious schools) in 10 areas in Greater Jakarta and its surroundings totalling 59 private schools and 41 public schools. A conclusion of this survey shows that there are more than 63% of junior and senior high school students who claim to be willing to involve themselves in the act of sealing the houses of worship from other faiths. The survey data also indicates that 25% of students and 21% of teachers state Pancasila ideology to be irrelevant again while 84.8% of students and 76.2% of teachers state their agreement with the idea of Sharia implementation in Indonesia. It is also reported that number of students who agree the

violence for religious solidarity reaches 52.3% while 14.2% of them justify bomb attacks. The survey does not explain what causes the significant number of students agrees violence act in dealing with religious moral issues because the survey is definitely not profound.

Other research findings on this issue comes from Indonesian security agency; BIN (*Badan Intelijen Negara*/ National Intelligence Agency). The agency carried out the research in 2017 and it stated that 39% of university students had been exposed to radicalism ideas (*CNN Indonesia Online*, June 31, 2018). National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Head Budi Gunawan said that from the research BIN gave attention to the three universities because it was considered the basis of the spread of radical ideology among students. He did not mention the names of these three universities. Based on the research, Budi explained that there was an increase in religious conservative understandings. Around 24% of the students and 23.3% of high school students agreed jihad for the establishment of Islamic state in Indonesia (*CNN Indonesia online*, June 31, 2018). Meanwhile, a survey conducted by Alvara Research Center, involving 4200 university and senior high school students in Java and several major cities outside Java concluded some important findings. In the survey findings, almost 25% of students were ready to conduct jihad for the establishment of Islamic khilafah state, and 20% of the respondents prefered Islamic ideology if compared to Pancasila. Moreover, as many as 20% of the respondents prefered khilafah as an ideal form of government than the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The main conclusion of this survey was that the key issue of this radicalism related to university students (*BBC Indonesia online*, November 1, 2017).

The most current research on this issue comes from the Jakarta-based *Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity*. This research is conducted with the research object in three cities in Indonesia, i.e. Padang, Sukabumi and Solo. The research of The *Maarif Institute* was carried out in the period of October-December 2017. In addition to the above three cities, *Maarif Institute* also conducted the research with in the related topics in other three cities, i.e. Cirebon, Bali and Tomohon. The most important conclusion of the study was reported that high school students in Padang, Sukabumi and Solo were considered the most vulnerable ones to radical ideologies. In addition to historical factors that link the three cities at above, namely Padang, Sukabumi and Solo as the homeland of acts of terrorism, radicalism had infiltrated the students through extracurricular activities of Islamic spirituality activities or known as ROHIS (BBC Indonesia online, January 28, 2018). Particularly in Solo, *Maarif Institute* reported the findings that the seeds of radicalism that emerged in the scientific youth community focused on their activities on Islamic understandings. NU Online, an official media of Nahdatul Ulama, The Indonesian largest Islamic organization, suggest that the phenomenon of the so-called radicalization among Indonesian youth has been widespread in Indonesian archipelago (*NU Online*, 21 May 2018)

From the aforementioned introduction, at least two research questions can be formulated. Firstly, what does the news discourse come from the construction of mainstream media news on the perceived radicalisation phenomenon among Indonesian Muslim youth? Second, how can the news construction of the radicalisation phenomenon among Indonesian Muslim youth be justified (or falsified)?

Methodology and Theoretical Framework
The present study used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the research strategy. It serves both as method aand theoretical framework. According to Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), the CDA is viewed as 'critical' in which it aimed at revealing the role of discursive practice in the

maintenance of the social world including social relations that involve unequal relations of power. Furthermore, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that as a critical research, CDA does not understand itself as politically neutral (as in objectivist social science) but as a critical approach which is politically committed to social change. For the purpose of emancipation, critical discourse analytical approaches take the side of oppressed social groups (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). In addition to the above-mentioned, we will also apply the Viewpoint Diversity Theory from Baden & Springer (2015). Viewpoint Diversity

Journalistic news coverage plays an essential role for providing an audience with a diverse, multifaceted perspective upon public affairs (Baden & Springer, 2015). One of the key functions of the press in democratic societies is to inform their audiences about possible perspectives upon current events and contribute to a plurality of views (Porto, 2006, cited in Baden & Springer, 2015). Traditional mass media and journalism are frequently criticized for presenting only a limited range of views; new, participatory media are praised for their potential for increasing this range; and suitable means for safeguarding viewpoint diversity – legislation, economic structures, professional practices, audience participation, and so on (Baden & Springer, 2015).

According to Baden & Springer (2015), the public sphere can be modelled as an arena wherein diverse points are gathered and debated, generating pubic opinions as orientation for individuals as much as society at large. These debates are covered or sometimes staged by the media, inviting participation and rendering presented viewpoints available for democratic opinion formation (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991, cited in Baden & Springer, 2015). The importance of diverse viewpoints for democratic debates is easiest understood through the lens of framing theory: any communicative message selectively emphasizes certain aspects of complex reality framing it and enabling interpretation (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007, all cited in Baden & Springer, 2015).Therefore, as Baden & Springer (2015) argue, frames inevitably deselect many other aspects that could sustain other, equally plausible and relevant frames. The availability of frames advancing different interpretations of the same issues is a crucial measure of the quality of a debate: it enables audiences to consider multiple possible meanings of a situation, and adopt those it considers most pertinent (Porto, 2007, cited in Baden & Springer, 2015).

According to van Dijk, the interdependence of research interest and political commitment is perhaps the most prominent feature of CDA analysis. The purpose of CDA is to solve social problems that actually take the perspective of those who suffer from inequality in society. Therefore, they see discourse as a form of social practice. Fairclough and Wodak (1997, cited in Sharifi *et al*, 2016) argue that social discourse is constitutively and socially conditioned. It is the situation, the object of knowledge, and the social identity of the relationship between people and groups of people. In line with Fairclough and Wodak, it is said that the CDA, or supposedly, relates to two aspects: the discourse as the instrument of power and control, and the discourse as the instrument of social construction of reality (van Leeuwen, 1993). For Fairclough, text analysis alone is not enough to do a good CDA because it does not explain the relationship between texts and processes and social and cultural structures. Therefore, an interdisciplinary perspective is required that incorporates textual and social analysis. For this reason, we will apply other approaches besides CDA, i.e. in-depth interviews with relevant research informants.

There are two types of data for this study: primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected from a series of in-depth interviews with 26 resource persons in six cities in

Java, namely Jakarta, Solo, Sukoharjo, Jogjakarta, Surabaya and Pasuruan. The interviews were conducted in the period of February-May 2018. The research informants consisted of university professors, heads of Islamic Boarding School (pesantren), heads of Muslim preachers association, NGO leaders, university student council heads and university Muslim students. The secondary data were gathered from 21 online mass media with 56 news items. For the present prelimanary study, the news scripts only came from four news mainstream media outlets to be analysed: antaranews.com (ANTARA News Agency), tempo.com (TEMPO), bbc.com/indonesia (BBC Indonesia and cnnindonesia.com(CNN Indonesia). The other seventeen news media outlets would be analysed in the second phase of this research.

Analysis
This study, as written in the title, is an on-going research. Therefore, the results of analysis in this research remains tentative / preliminary findings and requires further analysis. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions or findings that can be reported primarily for news text analysis supplemented with some analysis of in-depth interviews with research informants. There are several findings related to the discourses which can be unpacked from the mainstream media news outlets. After adopting the model analysis from Sharifi et al (2016), our analysis will be focused on two types of analysis, i.e. the analysis at the meaning level and analysis related to the level of style.

Analysis at the Meaning Level
According to van Dijk (1991), CDA in the level of meaning consists of many textual elements. The analysis on the news reporting of radicalization at the level of meaning reveals that implicitness, generalization, clarity and vagueness as well as categorization are the elements that mostly benefit from the speakers to convey a sense of Islamophobic perceived at this level. The excerpts will be taken from four big news media in Indonesia, namely Antara, TEMPO, BBC Indonesia and CNN Indonesia discussed as follows :

Excerpt 1:
Title: *Mengendus Jejak Teroris di Kampus* (Uncovering the terrorist trail in campus)
The body of news: "Selain itu, Nandang juga mengatakan Densus 88 Antiteror dan Polda Riau menangkap tiga terduga teroris" (Moreover, Nandang said the Densus 88 Antiterror and Polda Riau arrested three suspected terrorists, www.antaranews.com, 4 June 2018).
Writing the above news headline from antaranews.com has two distinct categories of meaning: terrorist and suspected terrorist. The difference in the writing is a categorical error that can lead to misinterpretation for news consumers. The interpretation that can be obtained from the news items at above is that the suspected terrorists has the same meaning with terrorists.

Excerpt 2:
Title: *Satu dariEempat Pelajar Indonesia 'Siap Berjihad': Bagaimana Sekolah Menangkal Radikalisme?* (One in four Indonesian students 'ready for jihad': How do Schools Prevent Radicalism?, www.bbc.com/indonesia, 1 November 2017).
The body of news: "Contoh, guru menyajikan video aksi 212 di Monas dan dibumbui dengan ceramah-ceramah, itu menurut saya menebar kebencian" (For example, a teacher presents his students with the video of the 212 mass rally at the Monas Square (the national monument in Jakarta) supplemented with lectures, in my opinion, it can be considered as the spread of hate speech!)

The above news title does not explain clearly what the definition of "jihad" and "going to jihad" means. Moreover, there is no explanation about the definition of jihad and going for jihad in the news item. Consequently, this can lead to a blurry meaning for the news consumers. BBC.com Indonesia in the news article at above does not provide an explanation of what the spread of hate speech means. The video of the peaceful mass rally 212 at the Monas Square (National Monument in Jakarta) is framed as an act of spreading hate speech without sufficient argumentation, i.e. why it can be categorized as an act of such a hate speech. BBC.com Indonesia, inaccurately inserting an interview excerpt with the above source, can be seen to give a negative association in the peaceful demonstration conducted by various elements of the Muslim community on December 2, 2017. With this technique, it will implant into news consumers' mind that everything related to the peaceful demonstration in Jakarta Monas 212 is not good because it considers it as a tool to spread hate speech., BBC Indonesia implicitly has applied Islamophobic journalism. When viewing from the entire news article at above, there are at least four terms that the BBC Indonesia has failed to explain accurately: the definition of 'radical', 'radicalism', 'going to jihad' and 'radical material'.

Excerpt 3:
Title: *Paham Radikal Di Kampus Kita (Radicalism in Our Campus*, www.tempo.co (Opinion, May 28 –June 3, 2018).
Body of News: Propaganda radikalisme cukup menarik calon korban ke grup Telegram dan WhatsApp, lalu mencuci otak mereka dengan ideologi-ideologi sesat (It is very simple that radicalism propaganda only draw potential victims to Telegram and WhatsApp groups, then brainwashing with perverted ideologies occurs to them).
Most debates involve form of generalization in which events or actions are generalized and represented broadly (van Dijk, 2003, as cited in Sharifi et al, 2016). TEMPO makes generalization that Muslim students who have groups in social media such as Telegram and WhatsApps are successfully brainwashed with radicalism propaganda of the perverted ideologies. In fact, in their investigation, TEMPO only raises the case of a Muslim student arrested by police when commiting (allegedly) the terror act at the police headquarter. Moreover, TEMPO does not clearly and sharply define what it mean perverted ideology and how brainwashing is carried out on the social media groups. Finally, the definition of radicalism as reported in the magazine, is left unclear.

Analysis at the Level of Style
Examining the Muslim youth radicalism news reporting at the level of style reveals that Lexicalizations is an important ideological tool for the news media under study to construct their Islamophobic discourse at this level.

Excerpt 4:
Title: *Terengah Menangkal Yang Radikal* (Gasping Against Who Have Radicalism Ideas, www.tempo.co, Opinion, May 28 –June 3, 2018).
Body of news: Selain UI, ITB dan UIN Alauddin,kampus yang paling parah paparan radikalismenya adalah Institute Pertanian Bogor (IPB). Kampus negeri ini merupakan rumah lahir Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia pada 1982 (Instead UI, ITB and UIN Alauddin, the most severe campus exposed to radicalism is Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). This campus is the birthplace of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia born in 1982.

According to van Dijk (2008), depending on the ideological view point of the speakers, a similar meaning can be expressed in various words. Fairclough (1995, as cited in Sharifi et al,

2016) defines Lexisalization as an 'unwritten and unspoken convention when using certain words or expressions in connection with some events or behaviors which are operative and taken for granted in the production and interpretation of texts. He further states that the purpose of this analysis highlights the role of the lexicon, particularly if it has been naturalized and accepted as a natural code and identifies or creates alternative lexicalization resulting from different ideological positions. Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia has been banned since early 2018 and therefore is commonly and unfairly perceived as the home base of a radical Islamic group. By highlighting IPB as the birthplace of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, TEMPO can be considered to associate IPB with the birthplace of a radical group. In other words, IPB has been unfairly victimized as the home for radical (Muslim) students. After applying the lexicalization strategy, TEMPO has accused IPB as the guilty by association.

Conclusion

This research is still far from being complete as many things are in progress. However, one important but tentative conclusion can be reported as follows. It indicates that Indonesia's mainstream news media coverage on radicalization issues among the younger generation of Islam can have produced Islamophobic discourse. Despite the increasingly intense influence of this discourse in establishing Indonesian society's perception on radicalization among the younger generation (students and high school and junior high school students), it can not be specified as it requires a much deeper and holistic research. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the news content of some mainstream media in Indonesia indicate to have applied Islamophobic journalism. To further clarify this claim, we remain in the process of finalizing further analysis. The analysis involves more news texts and in-depth interview transcripts.

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