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CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE CHANGE IN THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION IN INDONESIA

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Abstract:

This paper examines the following puzzle in the Indonesian electoral results: while the 2019 election showed clear cleavage voting at the presidential level, such voting was not apparent in the national legislative elections, which are held at the same time. It considers two different explanations for this divergence, split-ticket voting and the distinctions in the electoral system between the presidential election and the election for the national legislature. It concludes that the structure of the different voting systems does the best job of explaining the differences in voting patterns.

Keywords:

Social Cleavages, Presidential Election, Legislative Election And Political Parties

Introduction

After the Jakarta election in 2017, social cleavages had arisen, mainly when an Islamic movement emerged during the campaign of the governor election, led by the leader of *Front Pembela Islam* (the Islamic Defenders Front-FPI), Habib Rizieq. The Rizieq actions in the Jakarta election had increased the escalation of conflict between Islamic groups and secular nationalists ahead of the 2019 general election. The *Aksi Bela Islam* (Action to Defend Islam) led by Rizieq, which was later named 'The Group of 212', resulted in various allegations against Habib Rizieq by the ruling party.

During the presidential and legislative election campaigns, social cleavage issues had increased. The issue of communist revival and Islamic caliphate had been used by two supporters of the candidates to attack their opponents. Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) supporter asserted that Prabowo Subianto, as caliphate supporter, would establish an Islamic state if Prabowo could win in the election. On the contrary, Prabowo and his allies attacked Jokowi with the issue of communist revival.

The issues of social cleavages were the main issues that emerged after the 2017 Jakarta election. The result of the presidential election showed that Prabowo obtained massive support in some Muslim majority communities. On the contrary, Jokowi won in the non-Muslim region. However, the result of the presidential election showed a difference from the parliamentary election. Even though Prabowo won 57 percent in South Sulawesi, 60 percent in Riau, and 62 percent in Banten, Jokowi's party coalition still won in these areas, the Golkar (Party of Functional Groups) and National Democrat Party (Nasdem) won in South Sulawesi and Riau, and the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDIP) in Banten.

The differences between the presidential and legislative elections showed a gap that influenced the voters in the presidential election and legislative elections. If cleavage structure influenced voter choices, then consistent patterns of voting between the presidency and the legislature should be seen. Instead, split-ticket voting was evident. Therefore, this paper will analyze the impact of social cleavage issues on the presidential and legislative elections based on this gap. This paper finds that the social cleavages influenced the voters in the presidential election, but these cleavages did not impact the political parties.

This paper will be organized into some sessions to analyze this problem, namely a literature review that will explain social cleavages and cleavage-based voting, split-ticket voting, and party system in Indonesia. Then, this paper will discuss social cleavages in the presidential and legislative elections.

Literature Review

This section will explain the definition of social cleavages and cleavage-based voting as the operational definition to understand the social cleavages in Indonesia, then discuss the model of social cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and discuss split-ticket voting as a consequence of the decline of social cleavages.

Definition of Social Cleavage and Cleavage-based Voting

Definition of social cleavages has become a debate among scholars. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) proposed a social cleavage approach to understand party system did not define social cleavages (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Ford & Jennings, 2020), so that definition of social cleavages is still vague. Some literature has defined social cleavages. However, such definition becomes overlaps with other approaches because social cleavages are defined based on different research interests and approaches, and the research of social cleavages does not use appropriate methods (Franklin, 2010, p. 649; Zuckerman, 1975, p. 232). Most literature defines social cleavages by linking to the characteristic of political conflict, where political issues become significant and direct causes that encourage cleavages (Zuckerman, 1975, p. 232).

Rae and Taylor (1970) tried to straighten the meaning and criteria of cleavages. They defined cleavage as a division of the community into groups that could be differed into three aspects: ascriptive (such as race, ethnicity, and caste), attitudinal (such as ideology), and behavioral (such as organizations). In the meantime, Bartolini and Mair (1990, p. 215) and Mair (2006, p. 373) defined cleavages as a profound social division in the communities that contain three elements, namely social division, collective identities, and organization expression. Social division is an empirical element that can be defined in social-structural terms such as religion and ethnicity. Collective identities is a normative element “that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element,” such as farmer or worker. Then organization expression is “the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations...which develop as part of the cleavages” such as political parties, organizations, unions, or associations.

Meanwhile, Flanagan (1973, p. 64) defined social cleavages as “potential lines of division within any given society.” Division within society could be defined into three criteria, namely segmental, cultural and economic-function cleavages. Segmental cleavages refer to society's identity such as race, ethnicity, religion, and linguistic, then cultural cleavages could be looked at regional, traditional, and modernism. In contrast, economic-function describes the differences in economic statuses, such as class. In the meantime, Brooks and Manza (1997, p. 938) defined cleavage as “the difference in political alignment among groups constituting a particular dimension of social structure. This definition is more straightforward because cleavage can be understood from the differences between a group and other conflicting groups.

Some cleavage definitions above show that cleavage could be defined as the differences embedded within society that shape social and political identities into two or more groups. The identity of society could be obtained from various ways such as through inheritance forming race, ethnicity, caste, or outside influences that were influenced by ideology, religion, or opinion, regionalism that shapes economic and urban-rural cleavages.

One of the aspects that become a concern by scholars in social cleavage research is cleavage-based voting. Cleavages-based voting is one of the research focuses on Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Zuckerman (1975, p. 234) highlighted three aspects in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) research: the formation of a cleavage hierarchy, the relationship between cleavages and formation and persistence of parties, and the relationship between cleavages and electoral behaviour. Cleavage-based voting is defined by Brooks and Manza (1997, p. 938) and Brooks et al. (2006, p. 92) as “in term of the magnitude of the average difference in political alignment among groups comprising a particular cleavage.” The magnitude aims to know the different political alignment between two groups, such as men and women, whom their partisanship can measure. By knowing the different political alignment, political parties can strengthen the voter loyalty and stabilize the political party support (Elff, 2007; Elff & Roßteutscher, 2017)

Social Cleavages: Lipset and Rokkan Model

The formation of social cleavage in the Lipset and Rokkan's (1967, p. 14) research was caused by two revolutions: the national revolution and the industrial revolution. The national revolution produces national interest, so that state needs to centralize, standardize, and develop nation-state interest. In contrast, the industrial revolution produces tension in the market. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) described four lines of social cleavages in the party system that were caused by two revolutions. The national revolution produced conflict between the church-state and the

center-local or periphery. At the same time, the industrial revolution caused conflict between the working class-employers and tenant- landowner.

Church-state cleavage is a conflict that is not limited by demography boundaries. This conflict emerged as a response to Church domination in social life, especially in the education field. However, the state wanted to control the education system to create education standards nationally. This conflict produced tensions between the secular and the religious groups that want to organize social life. Whereas center-local cleavages emerged from national groups, who want to set standards in various aspects of social and political life. Local groups felt that the standardization would discriminate against local groups. Center-local cleavages could also produce conflict between different social groups, such as ethnic or linguistic conflict.

Tenant-Landowner and working class-employer were two cleavages that emerged after the French revolution. The industrial revolution had influenced the industrial development that encouraged the new capitalist groups to expand the new industry. Industrial development had become a threat to landowners who focus on plantation and agricultural development. Industrial development also produced conflict between the working class and employers. The Labour movement had emerged as an injustice from the employer that did not pay attention to workers' rights.

Four different cleavage structures became an essential aspect for Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in analyzing the formation and persistence of political parties. Political elites would form political parties based on social cleavages. Then social cleavages were politicized to make voter alignment, and social structure would be frozen to become the political base for political parties (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Lijphart, 2011, 2012).

However, some scholars criticize the social cleavage approach. For example, Sartori (1990, p. 176) stated that social cleavage fundamentally could understand the real problem that emerged in the society because social cleavages are not only understood in the economic and class structure but also the differences in society such as ethnic, religious, regional and linguistic. However, the problem of social cleavages is not all social cleavages can be translated into the party system because the translator plays a vital role in translating social cleavages. Criticism was also expressed by Lybeck (1985), who argued that the social cleavage politicization could not guarantee that political parties have stable support because the evidence that political parties have longevity cannot be adequately proven. For example, the party system in some industrially advanced countries faces the decline of social cleavages so that the cleavage issues and also ideology do not become the main factor that can influence the voters (André, 2015; Dalton, 1984, 2003; Dalton & Burklin, 2003; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2003).

Even though some scholars criticize the concept of social cleavages, Bornschier (2009) suggested that using the social cleavages approach can help understand party systems, such as the formation of political parties, institutionalized party systems, voting behavior, and the conflict between new and old democracies. Therefore, to understand the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Indonesia, this paper will use the social cleavage approach.

Split-Ticket Voting

Split-ticket voting can generally be defined as voters voting candidates from some political parties to the different office levels. Burnham (1965, p. 9) defined split-ticket voting as “the

difference between the highest and lowest percentages of the two-party vote cast for either party among the array of statewide offices in any given election.” Split-ticket voting could occur in all electoral system that voters need to vote the candidate in the different level both in the presidential and legislative election, such as in the US and Latin America (Burden & Kimball, 2004; Fiorina, 1992; Samuels, 2004), and single-member district or mixed electoral (Moser & Scheiner, 2005).

Many factors can cause Split-ticket voting. The Policy-balancing model, for example, explains that voters divide their votes for executive and legislative candidates in the election to create a policy balancing between the executive and legislative branches so that political parties in the parliament could control each institution (Fiorina, 1992; Kedar, 2006). Furthermore, the candidate-centered campaign also becomes a factor that encourages split-ticket voting (Ames, Baker, & Renno, 2009; Moser & Scheiner, 2005; Wattenberg, 1991). Candidates no longer carry cleavage or ideology issues, but they tend to show their personality, family, professional work, or political programs. Candidate-centered campaigns or personalization directly impact the voters because the electorate will evaluate the candidates than political parties or social cleavage issues (Dalton, 2002, p. 173).

Strategic defection also becomes an alternative in understanding split-ticket voting. In an election, voters will vote for preferred candidates. However, if preferred candidates are not viable, voters will vote for nonviable candidates (Karp, Vowles, Banducci, & Donovan, 2002). In the meantime, Fisher (2004) stated that split-ticket voting could be influenced by voters who tend to vote for candidates who can win in the election (Fisher, 2004).

However, in the Indonesian case, Qodari (2016) states that split-ticket voting models in western countries cannot explain split-ticket voting in Indonesia. Qodari (2016) explained that split-ticket voting in Indonesia is caused by three leading indicators: low information, low political involvement, and candidate figure. In the meantime, Muhtadi (2013) asserted that money politics had become an essential factor in explaining split-ticket voting in Indonesia. Candidates could exchange material benefits to change their votes based on the materials that voters obtained.

Party System in Indonesia

In the Indonesian party system, the interaction between political parties and voters is developed on the basis of social cleavages, especially between Islam and secular (Baswedan, 2004; King, 2003; Nurjaman, Suprpto, & Masmuh, 2018). However, the issues of social cleavages had undergone a process of de-alignment after the 2004 election. Direct presidential elections had eroded social cleavages (Aspinall, 2005; Ufen, 2006, 2008b, 2008a) and an open list system had changed the pattern of voting behaviour (Fossati, 2019a), so that religious issues did not influence the voters if compared to the candidate’s personality (Mujani & Liddle, 2004, 2010; Mujani, Liddle, & Ambardi, 2018)

Even though many observers state that social cleavages had weakened, Higashikata and Kawamura (2015) state that religious cleavages still existed in Indonesia in some districts, especially in supporting Islamic parties. Besides, secular-religious and traditional-modernist Islam cleavages also still influenced the Indonesian party system (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016) and the social cleavages were stronger in Javanese communities (Fossati, 2019b).

In the 2019 election, the social cleavage issues increased between Islam and secular-nationalists especially the issues of caliphate and communism. However Fernandes (2018) stated that this issue did not influence the presidential election because the votes for Jokowi and Prabowo could not change. A survey conducted by Indikator Politik Indonesian (Indonesian Indicator Politics) and the local election commission in West Sumatera also showed that social cleavages did not change the voting behavior. One of the factors that influenced the voters was candidates and political programs (Minang Satu, 2019; Tempo, 2019b). Otherwise, Sirait (2019), Fossati (2019b), and Aminah (2019) found that political identity still influenced Indonesian politics. Fossati (2019b) stated that social cleavages influenced the voters mainly if associated with political party choice. However, if looking at the link between political Islam and policy evaluation, especially the Jokowi policies, this correlation is less clear. Sirait (2019) stated that the impact of cleavage issues was only in some areas and that in other areas, sociological factors had more influence on voter choice. In the meantime, Aminah (2019) in her research on young voters found that the issues of communism and Islam during election had an impact on determining the choices of young voters.

However, understanding the social cleavage impact in the 2019 Indonesian election should look at two levels: the presidential and legislative elections, because these were both run simultaneously. The election results showed that the issues of cleavages had an impact on the presidential election and less impact on the legislative election. The differences between the presidential and legislative elections showed a gap that influenced the voters in the presidential election and legislative elections. From this difference, a question that needs to be answered is why voting based cleavages had an impact on presidential election and did not have an impact on legislative election? Based on this question, this paper will analyze social cleavage issues on the presidential and legislative elections. This paper contributes to the understanding of social cleavages in the Indonesian party system, because social cleavages, as described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), did not have a robust influence on political parties in the 2019 Indonesian election. The Presidential election was stronger to cleave the society based on the cleavage issues.

Research Data

In the research about cleavage-based voting, quantitative research is used to analyze the electorate behavior as primary data. However, quantitative data in this research comes from the survey results conducted by some research institutions during and post-election. Further data in this article is sourced from the media, particularly online newspapers. The media shared much information on the results of the surveys published by research institutions and gave information about social cleavages during the political campaigns. Furthermore, the media also gave information about the events, cases, or political conflicts during the election period. Data from the media can help analyze the social cleavage in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Indonesia.

Data from survey institutions is addressed to analyze cleavage-based voting characteristics, such as regional-center or urban-periphery, church-state, working class-employer, and tenant-landowner cleavages. Even though some characteristics that were proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) did not appear in the Indonesian party system, the new cleavages could be identified by looking at the conflict between two social cleavages, such as Muslim modernists and traditionalists.

Cleavages in the Presidential Election

The first question in this paper is what presidential election does influence cleavage-based voting? How to identify and differs one cleavage from others? For example, how to differ between ethnic cleavages and geographic cleavages? If cleavages occurred, what are the factors that encouraged the cleavage in the presidential election? This section will answer and discuss these questions.

Church-State Cleavages

The 2019 presidential election showed that the voters had been divided into some cleavages. Church-state cleavage (Islam and secular-nationalist) was the main issue that increased in the 2019 election if this cleavage was compared with the previous election. Church-state cleavage began to appear in the 2014 presidential election between Prabowo and Jokowi (Mujani et al., 2018). It increased during and after the Jakarta election in 2017 between Anies Baswedan and Basuki Thahja Purnama (otherwise known as Ahok).

In the Jakarta election, Anies was assumed to represent political Islam, even though the political parties nominated Anies to come from a coalition between secular and Islamic parties, namely Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party) and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). In contrast, Ahok is a Christian Indonesian of Chinese background and was supported by the ruling parties. Before election day, some surveys showed that the electability of Ahok was higher than Anies (Tempo, 2019a). Cleavage issues emerged when Ahok's speech on 27th September, 2017, in the Kepulauan Seribu was considered to be in contempt of Islam. Ahok's speech then had spread widely and became a discourse in cyberspace, not only on the religious side but also on political matters (Ahyyar & Alfitri, 2019; Pamungkas & Octaviani, 2017). Some Islamic groups mobilized a series of demonstrations known as Islamic Defence Action or 212 groups, demanding that the police investigate Ahok's speech. Many Islamic organizations, including some members of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), supported the 212 groups, even though the NU is an Islamic organization that supported Jokowi and Ahok in the 2012 Jakarta and the 2014 presidential election. However, the issues of Ahok speech split the NU, so that the leader of the NU did not appear to have taken a firm decision to ban its members from engaging in the action. The politicization of Ahok's speech harmed the secular groups. Some surveys showed that the electability of Ahok declined sharply after his speech in the Kepulauan Seribu (Detiknews, 2016; Suara.com, 2016). In the 2017 Jakarta Election, Anies won, and Ahok went to jail for two years on charges of insulting Islam.

The translation of social cleavages in the 2017 Jakarta election affected the 2019 general election. The ruling parties saw that the emergence of the Islamic movement in the Jakarta election could become a threat in the 2019 election. The Leader of the FPI that led demonstrations and caused Ahok's incarceration, received a counterattack from Ahok's supporters. At the end of 2016, Rizieq faced some problems. For example, the Union of Catholic University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (PMKRI) reported Rizieq to the police with accusations that Rizieq's speech mocked the birth of Jesus. Before the case finished, a priest, Max Evert Ibrahim Tangkudung, reported Rizieq because Max had found a new video depicting a speech by Rizieq that recommend killing the priest. In another case, Rizieq was also accused by the police of seizing land owned by Indonesian State Forestry Company (Perhutani) (CNN Indonesia, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).

Many of Jokowi's supporters rallied to attack Rizieq. Various cases were reported to the police; one case had not finished yet, and new cases were reported. Still in 2017, some cases emerged after some organizations such as the Red and White Solidarity Group (Solmet) reported Rizieq to the police relating to Rizieq's statement that he found the communist symbol in Indonesian money. Solmet also stated that Rizieq had made the comment that communists had controlled Indonesia (Tempo, 2017). The most controversial issue was the pornography case. Rizieq became a suspect in the case of online chat sex with a woman, Firza Husein (the Jakarta Post, 2017). The accusations toward Rizieq by the secular-nationalist groups forced Rizieq to flee from Indonesia.

After Habib Rizieq, the government party directed its attack at one of the organizations supporting the 212 groups, namely HTI. Citing security reasons, the government then dissolved the HTI after the Jakarta election in 2017 because the values of the HTI's struggle contradicted *Pancasila* (Indonesia ideology), and their activities were considered to be a threat to national stability and community (Kompas.com, 2017). However, some scholars stated that the dissolution of HTI for security reasons was not the real reason, that the political interests of Jokowi and his groups seemed stronger than security reasons (Aswar, 2018) and this security reason tended to "maintain pressure on his Islamic foes" (Fealy, 2017). Moreover, the ban of HTI was an opportunity for Jokowi to split Islamic support for Prabowo. The case of Ahok showed that the supporters of the 212 groups were not from FPI and HTI only, but also from the NU itself. The dissolution of HTI would retract the NU members in the 212 groups and strengthen the minority group's trust to support Jokowi.

The cleavage that was undertaken by Jokowi and his allies can be found during the political campaign. After the dissolution of HTI, provocation on Khilafah had increased. Banser NU and Anshor conducted raids on the members of the HTI. Moreover, Hendropriyono, the former head of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN), also provoked in the media. Hendropriyono stated that the 2019 election was different from the previous election in that the 2019 election was fighting between ideologies, namely *Pancasila* vs. Islamic caliphate. Therefore, he asked the voters to determine their choices to defend *Pancasila* as the state ideology. Hendro's statement implied that Jokowi and Ma'ruf Amin were the protectors of the state ideology, *Pancasila*, and in contrast, Prabowo and his allies wanted to establish an Islamic state (Merdeka.com, 2019).

Ethnic Cleavage

Besides Church-state cleavage, ethnic cleavages also increased if compared with previous elections. Ethnic cleavage fundamentally re-emerged in the 2014 election, the Javanese tended to support Jokowi, and the outer Islands preferred Prabowo (Mujani et al., 2018, p. 144). However, ethnic cleavage was not robust because the vice-presidential candidate came from non-Javanese ethnicities. In the 2019 election, the ethnic cleavage increased between Javanese and non-Javanese.

The increase of Javanese supported Jokowi because Javanese was not ready to accept the leaders from outside Java. A survey conducted by Survey & Polling Indonesia (SPIN) in 2014 showed that Javanese tended to support the president and vice president candidates who came from the same ethnic and refused the candidates from other ethnicities or combination between Javanese and non-Javanese. In comparison, non-Javanese could accept candidates from other ethnicities (Tempo, 2014). This tendency could be seen in the 2019 presidential election.

Jokowi and his vice are Javanese. In contrast, Prabowo had a vice presidential candidate that came from outside Java.

Second, Jokowi is considered to have a character that is very close to Javanese culture. At the same time, Prabowo comes from cosmopolitan Javanese that can be seen from family background and education. Third, Jokowi had developed his political career from the local government in Java so that he has a closeness with the Javanese community. In contrast, Prabowo had a background military, so that the ties between Prabowo and Javanese is weak. However, from the difference between Prabowo and Jokowi, a question that arises is whether this difference is due purely to ethnic cleavages or merely geographic cleavage?

In the 2019 presidential election, geographic cleavages did not significantly impact the voters than ethnic cleavages. Geographic cleavage could be understood as voter alignment in one place that is made by voters themselves to political parties (Agnew, 1996). Geographic cleavage could be caused by “the increased segregation of voters into cosmopolitan cities and conservative hinterlands, as well as the divergence of identities and interests resulting from this segregation,” and this cleavage is a new cleavage in the party competition (Ford & Jennings, 2020, p. 300).

Ethnic and geographic cleavages are often equated in the Indonesian context because ethnicity is concentrated in one area. When there is an ethnic cleavage, there is a tendency to express it as a geographical cleavage. However, in the 2019 presidential election, geographic cleavages were not the main description. Some provinces in Java Islands that are not dominated by Javanese tended to support Prabowo, such as West Java, and Banten dominated by Sundanese. Then, the Javanese is a majority ethnic group in Indonesia. According to Indonesian statistics 2010, Javanese are about 60 percent of the total ethnic population in Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010). Therefore, ethnic cleavage would be more robust in the election because candidates would politicize the ethnicity to attract the Javanese community.

This tendency could be looked at as the triumph of Jokowi in the Javanese areas such as Yogyakarta, Central, and East Java. Meanwhile, Prabowo won outside Java, such as in Sulawesi, Sumatera, and South Kalimantan and Sundanese community.

Table 1. The Bases of Prabowo and Jokowi Based Ethnicities

Province	The Candidates of President and Vice President		Ethnicity
	Jokowi-Ma'ruf (%)	Prabowo-Sandiaga (%)	
Aceh	14.41	85.59	Acehnese
West Sumatera	14.08	85.92	Minangkabau
West Java	40.07	59.93	Sundanese
South Sulawesi	42.98	57.02	Bugisnese/Makasarenese
South Kalimantan	35.91	64.09	Banjarenese
Banten	38.64	61.54	Sundanese
East Java	65.79	34.21	Javanese
Central Java	77.29	22.71	Javanese

Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Commission) (2019a)

Table 2. Survey Result: Support for Candidates based on Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Survey Result					
	Poltracking (1-8 April 2019)		CSIS (15-22 March 2019)		LIPI (27 April-25 May 2019)	
	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)
Javanese	64.4	27.0	60.5	20.6	75.0	17.1
Sundanese	35.1	60.7	42.3	46.7	37.5	47.5
Bataknese	55.6	26.7	55.2	25.9	85.3	12.0
Malays	26.1	67.8	37.1	52.6	21.3	65.0
Betawinese	25.4	69.0	39.3	32.1	19.4	61.1
Bugisnese/ Makasarenese	45.2	42.9	37.3	39.8	44.9	40.8
Minangkabau	30.2	69.8	16.7	66.7	15.2	81.8
Maduranese	47.4	41.0	39.5	44.7	59.5	38.1
Acehnese	-	-	20.5	77.3	20.0	73.3
Other ethnicities	61.2	33.5	59.3	31.7		

Sources: Poltracking Indonesia (2019), Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2019), LIPI (2020, p. 90).

Tables 1 and 2 showed that some areas were more competitive between Jokowi and Prabowo, such as South Sulawesi. Prabowo only won 57 percent, while Jokowi obtained 42 percent of the vote. In comparison, South Sulawesi is not dominated by the Javanese. This difference can raise the question: Do these differences indicate that geographical cleavage is stronger than ethnic cleavage?

In the case of South Sulawesi, the triumph of Prabowo was not only determined by ethnicities, but other cleavages also influenced, especially Church-state (Islam-secular) and religion cleavages. In South Sulawesi, Bugis and Makasar are two main ethnicities, and most of them are Muslim. In comparison, others are Christian (Protestant and Catholics). Therefore, in some areas, some cleavages could explain the support for presidential candidates. In this case, religious cleavage became a primary factor that influenced the electorates.

Religion Cleavages

In the previous election, religion did not have much impact on voter behavior. Party identification and personality of the leader were two crucial aspects that influenced the voters, besides, the number of candidates who competed in the 2004 and 2009 election was more than two, and the candidates had a different political stream, such as Muslim traditionalist, modernist and secularist, so that leader personality was more potent than the religion issue (Mujani & Liddle, 2010; Mujani et al., 2018). However, religious cleavage began to appear in the 2014 elections between Jokowi and Prabowo (Mujani et al., 2018). In the 2014 presidential election, Prabowo had been supported by some Islamic leaders, so Prabowo was described as a leader who could protect the Muslim interests even though Prabowo's mother and his sibling are not Muslim. At the same time, Jokowi was seen as anti-religious, communist, and non-

Muslim. Even though Prabowo could use religion to mobilize the masses, these issues could not be used alone by Prabowo to win in the 2014 election because other issues played an important role that influenced the electorate (Mujani et al., 2018, p. 141).

In the 2019 presidential election, the religion cleavage increased sharply, and voter mobilization was based on religion splitting the voters into two blocks, namely Islam and non-Islam. In the 2014 election, LSI found that 70 percent of non-Muslim voted for Jokowi (Kabar24, 2018) and this number increased in the 2019 election. Based on some surveys, the non-Muslims gave their support for Jokowi.

Table 3. The Support for Candidates Based on Religion

Religion	Survey Result			
	LIPI		KI	
	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)
Islam	51.2	38.6	45.3	36.0
Protestant	98.3	0.9	90.2	6.5
Catholic	94.3	0	95.3	2.3
Hindu	86.2	0	87.9	0
Buddhist	77.8	22.2		
Confucian	100	0	50.0	-

Sources: LIPI (2020, p.89) and, Konsep Indonesia (2019)

Note: KI survey incorporated between Hindu and Buddhist and separated Confucian. Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian did not vote for Prabowo. However, 12.1 percent of Hindu and Buddha and 50 percent of Confucian did not answer the question.

From the table above, Muslims gave around 45-47 percent of their votes to Jokowi, while other religions such as Catholic, Protestant, Hindus, and Buddhists supported Jokowi at more than 90 percent. The table above shows that the 2019 election's cleavages had been more profound than the previous election. If the survey results are compared to the election result, Jokowi also won in some non-Muslim areas.

Table 4. The Highest Votes for Jokowi in the Five Muslim Minority Provinces and Two NU bases

Province	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Religion (%)
Bali	91.68	8.32	Majority is Hinduism (83.4)
East Nusa Tenggara	88.57	11.43	Majority is Catholic (54.14) and Protestant (34.74)
North Sulawesi	77.24	22.67	Majority is Protestant (63.60),
Papua	90.66	9.34	Majority is Protestant (65.48), Catholic (17.67).
West Papua	79.81	20.19	Majority is Protestant (53.77), Islam (38.40) and Catholic (7.03%).
East Java	65.79	34.21	Majority is Muslim (96.36), NU bases
Central Java	77.29	22.71	Majority is Muslim (96.74), NU bases

Note: The percentage of religion in these areas based on the Indonesian census 2010 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010).

Table 5. The Highest Votes for Prabowo in Six Muslim Majority Provinces

Province	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Religion
Aceh	14.41	85.59	Majority is Muslim (98.18%)
West Sumatera	14.08	85.92	Majority is Muslim (98%) and Muhammadiyah is the largest Islamic organizations.
West Java	40.07	59.93	- Majority is Muslim. - West Java became a base of Masyumi
South Sulawesi	42.98	57.02	- Majority is Muslim (89.63%)
South Kalimantan	35.91	64.09	- The majority is Muslim (96.67%)
Banten	38,64	61,54	- Majority is Muslim

Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2010).

Jokowi's victory among non-Muslim voters was due to Jokowi being considered a leader capable of protecting minorities. When Jokowi became mayor in Solo city, Jokowi had a vice mayor who is a Catholic. In Jakarta election, he was accompanied by Ahok who is a Christian and a Chinese. Then, when Jokowi became president in the first period, many his ministries were not Muslim.

Muslim Traditionalist and Modernist Cleavage

The Islamic modernist and traditionalist cleavage is a cleavage that does not become Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) concern, even though traditionalist and modernist cleavage can occur in all society. However, in the Indonesian case, traditionalist and modernist cleavage tend to unit in ethnicity and territory. Muslim traditionalist has a base in the East and Central Java, the majority of which are Javanese ethnicity. In this region, Jokowi won over Prabowo. While other regions such as West Sumatera become the base of Muslim modernist and Prabowo obtained massive support in this province (see table 5).

The Muslim traditionalist and modernist cleavage is an old conflict that reappeared in the 2019 presidential election. Muhammadiyah represents Islam modernists, and Nadhlatul Ulama represents traditionalists. Cleavages between Islamic modernists and traditionalists have emerged since the colonial period. Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, aims to educate the Muslims and purify Islam from the traditional and cultural influences that contradict Islamic values (Nakamura, 2012; Peacock, 1978). Meanwhile, the NU, established in 1926, aims to defend the Indonesian traditional and cultural values (Hasbullah, 2014; Ismail, 2011). However, Fealy and Bush (2014, p. 541) and Bush (2009, pp. 32–33) explained that the emergence of the NU fundamentally was to maintain the legitimacy and economy of traditional *ulama* that had diminished due to the presence of Muhammadiyah. They argue that before the development of Muhammadiyah, traditional *ulama* and their schools received financial assistance from middle-class groups, such as traders and landowners. However, the presence of Muhammadiyah changed the flow of these funds from traditional *ulama* to Muhammadiyah and its schools.

The cleavage between Islamic modernists and traditionalists continued after Indonesian independence. Even though Muhammadiyah and the NU were involved in forming Masyumi (Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) in 1945, the conflict between Muhammadiyah and NU could not be avoided. The internal conflict caused by the modernist group's domination at the party and cabinet encouraged the NU to form the PNU (Nadhlatul Ulama Party) in 1950. (Bush, 2009; Madinier, 2015; Munhanif, 2012).

After Soeharto's presidency, otherwise known as the New Order government, Muhammadiyah and the NU formed their party. PAN (the National Mandate Party) represents the modernist groups formed by Muhammadiyah leader Amin Rais, while the NU is represented by the PKB (the National Awakening Party-PKB). Even though these parties have social bases for political party support, the dealignment process affected both parties. PAN and PKB tend to be catch-all parties to obtain massive votes.

In the 2019 presidential election, the conflict between Muhammadiyah and the NU reappeared. The NU firmly stated support for Jokowi, while Muhammadiyah, even though it did not state openly, gave support to Prabowo. For example, Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, stated support for Prabowo. Then Daniel Anzar Simanjuntak, Muhammadiyah Youth Chairman, became Prabowo's spokesman.

The triumph of Jokowi and Prabowo in some regions could be described as a conflict between traditionalists and modernists. Prabowo won in West Sumatera, Banten and West Java, and Aceh. In West Sumatera, Prabowo won 85.95 percent. West Sumatera is known as Muhammadiyah and Tarbiyah Islamiyah bases. While in Banten and West Java, Prabowo won more than 60 percent. According to Mudzakkir (2019), in West Java, the Islamic Union (*Persatuan Islam-Persis*) and Muhammadiyah had developed in this province since the colonial period and have been very active in building their organization. In the 1955 election, West Java became a political base for Masyumi. Otherwise, Jokowi won in the traditional areas, such as East and Central Java, that became NU bases. Besides, the Islamic organizations such as FPI, *alkhairaat*, and *Salafi* opposing the NU also supported Prabowo over Jokowi. Some surveys showed that FPI and *alkhairaat* gave 100 percent of the votes to Prabowo (Liputan 6, 2019; Republika.co.id, 2019). LSI (Indonesian Survey Institute) also found that ahead of the election, the votes for Prabowo in the Islamic organizations increased, and for Jokowi declined except in the NU organization (Katadata.co.id, 2019).

Urban-Rural Cleavages

Since democratization, urban-rural cleavage, especially in the presidential election, still influences the electorates. Less educated and blue-collar workers have a tendency to be from rural areas. Conversely, urban people tend to have good education and income. Mujani et al. (2018, p.109) explained that rural areas tend to vote for the incumbent. In contrast, urban people tend to vote for the challenger because they have an attitude to change. However, urban people can change their attitude in the election and are not always anti-status quo. The opinion change of urban people depends on the incumbent performance. For example, in the 2009 presidential election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gained support from urban people because they perceived that Yudhoyono was better than other candidates. However, in the 2014 election, the presidential candidates were new, and president Yudhoyono and his party did not support and endorse any candidates. Therefore, the urban-rural cleavage was less relevant to analyze the 2014 presidential election (Mujani et al., 2018, p. 109).

In the 2019 presidential election, the incumbent faced his old challenger from the previous election. If looking at the Mujani et al. (2018) analysis in the previous election, the conservative rural areas would vote incumbent. Otherwise, the urban people who are more critical would support the challenger. In the 2019 presidential election, some surveys showed that Jokowi won in rural voters. Otherwise, Prabowo and Jokowi competed in the urban voters.

Table 7. The Support for Candidates Based on Urban and Rural

Institution	Survey Result			
	Rural		Urban	
	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)
Roy Morgan	63.5	36.5	53	47
Median	53.1	34.4	40	44
CSIS	57.2	35.9	45.6	35.9
LIPI	60.8	30.7	44.9	42.9

Sources: Roymorgan (2019), Tribunnews (2019a), CSIS (2019), LIPI (2020, p. 89)

The table above showed that Jokowi won in the rural and urban areas, even though the Median found that Prabowo won in the urban areas. This result is supported by Mujani et al. (2018) research, which showed that rural areas tended to support the status-quo and urban people tended to support the challenger. The competitiveness in urban areas showed another factor that influences the electorate in the urban areas. In this case, education can become an alternative to explain this difference.

Education Cleavages

In the Indonesian presidential election, the level of education has an impact on voter choices. For example, in the 2004 presidential election, Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi obtained 62 percent in the first round from the voters who had elementary education or less. Megawati and her party, PDIP, were described as a party that represented the lower classes. This number increased in the second round. While her challenger, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla, obtained considerable support from educated voters. In the 2009 election, Megawati-Prabowo had 64 percent support from the less educated. In comparison, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Budhiono gained 50 percent (Mujani et al., 2018, pp. 117–118).

In 2019, the level of education also influenced voters for the presidential candidates. The voters who had an elementary education or less tended to vote incumbent. Meanwhile, the voters who had a diploma or bachelor degree tended to vote challenger. Some surveys before the elections showed the lower the level of voter education, the higher the vote for Jokowi (See table 7).

Table 8. The Support for Candidates Based on Education

Education	Survey Result					
	Poltracking		CSIS		KI	
	Jokowi	Prabowo	Jokowi	Prabowo	Jokowi	Prabowo
<=elementary	64.4%	27.7%			54.8%	21.9%
Elementary	59.2%	33.7%	57.3%	28.0%	54.0%	32.8%
Junior High School	56.7%	34.6%			48.0%	32.9%
Senior High School	45.7%	48.3%	45.8%	39.9%	55.9%	29.7%
Diploma	32.6%	60.9%				
>=Bachelor Degree	40.8%	56.2%	35.2%	42.5%	35.8%	42.1%
Not Answer	60%	30%	50%	33.3%		

Sources: Poltracking (2019), CSIS (2019), Konsep Indonesia (2019)

Employment and Income Cleavages

In the Lipset and Rokkan (1965) analysis, the cleavages between social classes such as owner-worker cleavages become factors that can influence the voters. This cleavage fundamentally also influenced Indonesian voters in the presidential election. However, identifying social cleavages is not an easy way to be measured. Therefore, Mujani et al. (2018, p. 110) included income and employment to measure social class.

In the previous election, the proportion of blue-collar workers who supported Jokowi was larger than for Prabowo (Mujani et al., 2018, p. 120). In the 2019 presidential election, the blue-collar workers also tended to choose the incumbent rather than the challenger. While the votes from the white-collar or professionals were more competitive between Jokowi and Prabowo.

Table 9. The Support for Candidates Based on Occupation

Employment	Survey Result					
	CSIS		Poltracking		KI	
	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)	Jokowi (%)	Prabowo (%)
Labour and others	57.0	28.9				
Farmer/fishers	58.5	27.0	58.4	33.3	55.5	32.2
Unemployment	49.5	34.3				
Professional	28.6	28.6				
Civil	33.7	48.3	50.9	43.4	50.0	33.3
Servant/Teacher and others						
unemployed married women	52.1	35.2	52.1	42.5		
Others	52.2	39.9	44.7	45.3		

Sources: Poltracking (2019), CSIS (2019), Konsep Indonesia (2019)

The table above shows that competition between presidential candidates was highest among professional workers. Meanwhile, the labourers, fishers, farmers, and blue-collar workers gave their support for the incumbent. Interestingly, the CSIS survey found that almost 50 percent of civil servants such as bureaucrats, teachers, or lecturers who worked under the government,

voted for the challenger. It showed that the level of employment and also education influenced the voters.

Factors Encouraging Cleavage in the 2019 Presidential Election

The number of candidates became an important aspect that encouraged social cleavages. In the previous election, the number of candidates was more than two candidates. They came from many political streams, such as secular, Muslim traditionalist, and modernist, so that the voters had some choices (Mujani et al 2018). However, two candidates competed in the 2019 presidential election and became the second match between Jokowi and Prabowo.

This second match would make it easier for voters to identify themselves into cleavage groups. The voters could evaluate and review what the government policy had been profitable to voters, especially, that supported another candidate in the previous election. Voter groups who feel marginalized or ignored by the government would support the opposition in the next election and eventually formed a social cleavage between one group of candidate supporters. The government policy would become issues that could be politicized and would shape cleavages in the communities (Lijphart, 2012; Zielinski, 2002).

Furthermore, media also played an essential role in forming social cleavages, especially in shaping Islamic identity. Media divided the issue of Islamic identity between Jokowi and Prabowo based on events that occurred and the issues conveyed by candidates during the political campaign (Ahmad, 2019). The media's role in encouraging cleavages could be separated from the media ownership. For example, Metro TV and TV One are two influential televisions owned by political elites. Since the 2014 election, Metro TV tended to support Jokowi and TV One focused on Prabowo. During Jokowi government, Metro TV had broadcast the Jokowi's policies, and TV One had become a government watchdog (Ahmad, 2019; Putra, Djuyandi, Yusa, & Mani, 2017).

Moreover, the government actions during the campaign were also a driving factor for social cleavages. Certain groups who were not in line with the government during the campaign were arrested on various charges. The government actions on the opposition showed the decline of Indonesian democracy and the turn of the authoritarian system (Power, 2018). Most of the opposition groups came from Islamic organizations, and the government dissolved some these organizations. In comparison, government supporting groups that had been reported by opposition to the police appear to have been ignored.

With the dissatisfaction of some groups with the government and no other presidential candidates, individuals or groups would easily be divided into social divisions. Even though the candidates who their supported were not appropriate with their expectation.

Parliamentary Election and Social Cleavages

The influence of social cleavages on the voters in the legislative election has changed from one election to another. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the social cleavages were still vital to become social bases for political party support. For example, Ufen (2008b) found that the party system in 1999 and 2004 could not avoid some cleavages such as center-periphery, state-church, urban-rural, capital-labor.

The tendency of social cleavages that influenced voters to select political parties could be found in some geographical areas. For example, Golkar represented the periphery, especially in the outer Islands, such as in Sulawesi. Simultaneously, PDIP represented centers such as in Java, Bali, and the Christian regions. Meanwhile, some Islamic parties such as PAN and PKS represented urban Muslims. In contrast, PKB represented rural areas.

Based on all cleavages, Ufen (2008b) found a new cleavage in Indonesia, namely the status quo-reformation cleavage. Some political parties such as Golkar and The United Development Party (PPP) represented the status quo. Other parties such as PKB and Democratic Party (PD), and PKS were on the reformation side that focused on specific policy areas. Therefore, Ufen (2008b, 2008a) asserts that Indonesia's social cleavages, especially in the 1999 and 2004 elections, were still robust in influencing party systems in Indonesia.

However, the cleavage issues in the 2019 legislative election had declined. For example, regionalism tended not to become the main issue that could influence the voters. This change occurred after the 2004 election, because political parties had developed to be more national parties than representing local areas. For instance, in the 2004 election, the PD had massive support in Jakarta, West and East Java, but in the 2009 election, the PD obtained massive support nationally. In the 2014 election, the support for the democrats declined. Another example is PKB and PDIP having support bases in East and Central Java. In the 2009 election, the support for PKB and PDIP declined because of the emergence of the PD, Nasdem, and the growth of Gerindra in the 2014 election (Mujani et al., 2018, p. 96). However, in the 2019 election, PDIP won in East Java, PKB in the second position, then Gerindra, Golkar, and Nasdem.

Cleavages between rural and urban areas also changed. Some political parties that were identified as urban (PAN and PKS) or rural (PKB) could not maintain their supporter bases, so that these parties tended to be catch-all parties. Mujani et al. (2018) found that since the first election in the 1999 election, political parties' support in urban and rural areas could change from one election to the next election, because level of education, social class, and governmental performance influenced the electorate in these areas in political party choice.

Besides, church-state (Islam and nationalists) was not a primary factor influencing the electorate. The number of Islamic parties declined, and the votes for Islamic parties were also not stable. Generally, Mujani et al. (2018) found, that social cleavages did not influence the legislative election because citizens could shift their choices.

Media had become an important aspect that encouraged the decline of social cleavages in the legislative election. The media was more focused on the presidential election because of more attractive for the audience than the legislative election. Besides, the media could benefit from the news on the presidential election to increase audience size. Furthermore, the presidential candidates also had an interest in media, and they could use media to reach a wider audience and target a specific audience. Therefore, media coverage on the presidential election impacted the political parties so that the issues of social cleavages did not occur in the 2019 legislative election.

The decline of social cleavages in the legislative election had also encouraged split-ticket voting at every electoral level. Candidate figure, personality, and party leader became factors

that had encouraged split ticket voting in legislative elections (Mujani et al., 2018; Qodari, 2016). The voters would evaluate the party leaders in the office and candidate personality. The 2019 parliamentary election showed that the candidates of the president and vice president impacted political parties. In the 2019 election, Jokowi came from PDIP and his vice, Ma'ruf Amin, was from the PKB. Meanwhile, Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno come from Gerindra. In the 2019 election, the votes for PDIP, PKB, and Gerindra increased nationally.




Figure 1. 2009, 2014 and 2019 Indonesian Election Result

Note: PSI, Berkarya, Garuda, and Perindo are new parties that compete in the 2019 election. While Nasdem competed in the 2014 and 2019 election

Source: KPU (2019b)

The figure above showed that in the 2014 election the number of PDIP votes increased in the 2014 and 2019 elections when Jokowi became the presidential candidate. Likewise, Golkar votes increased slightly in the 2014 election when Jusuf Kalla became Jokowi's vice-president. However, in the 2019 election, votes for Golkar decreased around two percent. In comparison, PKB votes increased when Ma'ruf Amin became the Jokowi's vice-presidential candidate. Meanwhile, Prabowo, who became the presidential candidate in the 2014 and 2019 elections, increased Gerindra votes. In 2014, Hatta Rajasa became Prabowo's vice-presidential candidate. The votes for PAN also increased.

Some Islamic parties could not increase their votes in the 2019 election. For example, PPP was one of the parties in Jokowi's coalition, but PPP votes declined in the 2019 election. The popularity of Jokowi could not impact PPP. The problem faced by PPP was the corruption scandal. The PPP leader was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for being involved in corruption ahead of the election. Meanwhile, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) could not increase its votes, even though this party became a part of Jokowi's coalition. The PBB faced internal conflict after the leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, decided to support Jokowi. In the 2019 election, only PKS could increase its votes. PKS developed a coalition with Gerindra in the 2017 Jakarta election that nominated Anies Baswedan and Prabowo in the 2019 election.

Besides, the parliamentary candidates also were stronger to influence split-ticket voting. The selection of candidates by political parties became a critical aspect in the 2019 parliamentary election. The voters tended to select the candidates rather than the political parties or the issues of social cleavages. A survey conducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) showed that the voters tended to choose the candidates they knew rather than political parties. From 1,200 respondents, 60.3 percent of voters would choose the candidates, while 26.6 percent looked at the political parties. The voters tended to choose the candidates because the political parties did not have different programs. The LSI concluded that the new political parties would face difficulties in appealing to the voters if compared with the large parties such as PDIP, Golkar, and Gerindra because these larger parties had many candidates who had popularity (Kompas.com, 2019). LIPI (2020) strengthened LSI research by finding that 65 percent of respondents chose the candidates, and 35 percent chose political parties. LIPI (2020, p. 81) found the following reasons that influenced the electorates to choose the candidates; respondents chose because of the candidate performance (incumbent) (20.5%) and candidate programs (17.5%). Then some respondents stated that they only knew this candidate (15.4 percent), careless choice (9.9%), and following the family (7.1%). While other factors such as; the candidates support the presidential candidates (5.3%), the voters obtained something from the candidates (4.8%), the voters followed the religious leaders (3.2%) and like this candidate (2%), did not have much impact on the voters.

The voter tendency to select the candidates they knew in the 2019 election could not be avoided from an open list system. This system encouraged candidates to promote themselves rather than their parties because they have to compete with other party candidates and candidates in their parties. Then the 2019 election also was more complicated than the previous election. In the previous election, the presidential election was separated from the parliamentary election. However, in the 2019 election, presidential and parliamentary elections were run simultaneously so that both political parties and voters tended to focus on presidential elections rather than the parliamentary elections. Besides, Political parties in coalition tended to campaign on presidential candidate programs rather than political party programs.

Moreover, the large number of candidates was problematic for citizens to vote because the electorates had determined the candidates on some levels, such as in the city, regency, province, national, and regional representative council (DPD), and presidential candidates. In the regency, city, or province, political parties proposed ten candidates and some candidates at the national level. LIPI (2020) found that 74 percent of respondents stated that they had difficulties in the 2019 election because of the many ballot papers they had to look at.

Another factor that influenced split-ticket voting was political party policy. On one side, political parties in the national level gave support for one candidate, but in the local level, political parties allowed their members to choose and promote another candidate. For example, the PD stated that they would support Prabowo. However, at the local level, the PD gave an opportunity to party members to support Jokowi with the reasons to obtain votes for PD in the Jokowi bases (Tempo, 2018). Another example is the PBB, as even though they declared support for Jokowi, this party gave an opportunity to its members to support Prabowo. The PBB needed the candidates to adapt to the local politics (Tribunnews, 2019b).

Besides, money politics has become a significant issue in Indonesian elections since the 1999 election. Ufen (2008b) highlighted that one of the factors that influence voter de-alignment is

money politics. The candidates appear to be bribing the voters with cash payment or goods and bribed electoral officials (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016, p. 3). The practice of money politics in Indonesia is perceived as a normal thing. LIPI (2020, p. 60), in its survey, found that 66.1 percent of respondents stated that money politics could be accepted and understood. Only 31.3 percent refused money politics. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents that received money or gifts from the candidates stated that they would consider the candidate's gift on the election day. Forty percent stated that they did not consider money or gifts from candidates, and 23 percent did not answer the question.

Money politics has changed the voting behaviour and reduced the ideological and social cleavage ties between the political parties and electorates. Money politics has resulted in political parties being unable to maintain the voters. As shown above, only 14 percent of voters voted for the same party from the previous election to the 2019 election.

Conclusion

Social cleavages in the 2019 election increased from the previous election. 'Anti-Pancasila,' 'radical Islamic', and 'communist' were terms used to describe the presidential candidates and their supporters. However, the result of social cleavage issues did not have much impact on the parliamentary election. With presidential and parliamentary elections that ran simultaneously, the proportional system had reduced the voter focus on the political parties. The issues in the presidential election were more vital in influencing the voters than legislative election.

The 2019 presidential election had created cleavages in the communities. The conflict between Muslim traditionalists and modernists reappeared, ethnic cleavages between Javanese and non-Javanese, and conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic were broader. Some sociological aspects such as education, region, employment, and income also influenced the voters, even though these cleavages were not too broad.

The role of media in the election became an essential aspect in increasing and reducing social cleavages in the presidential and legislative elections. As the information provider, media had encouraged polarization, especially in shaping Islamic identity between Prabowo and Jokowi's supporters, even though some factors also contributed to that polarization, such as government policy on the opposition. Meanwhile, in the parliamentary election, the decline of social cleavages had increased split-ticket voting. The open list system, leader personality, candidates of parties, and money politics in some cases became some factors that encouraged split-ticket voting and also voter de-alignment.

The cleavage structure in the presidential and legislative elections can change in future elections that could be influenced by electoral rule, the number of candidates, the combination between political stream and ethnicities, and social media.

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