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FEDERALISM: A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract:

Federalism, according to Elazar (1995), is an inevitable heterogeneous field that is rather difficult to discuss satisfactorily on a conceptual and theoretical level. Although the greatest strength of federalism is its adaptability or flexibility, this adaptability leads to ambiguity and creates significant conceptual and theoretical challenges, as mentioned by Erk (2006, p. 105) in a tangled mess of federalism definitions and context. Due to the fact that federalism already takes into account several perspectives, the terminology has been interpreted in various ways and adapted to match the various issues. Federalism is context-based, and context determines meaning. Since there is no commonly accepted definition of federalism (Ogunnoiki, 2017), federalism theories have also become a bigger, more complex topic that has gotten scant attention (Paleker, 2006). Given that the context of federalism is multifaceted and applied or understood differently by different people or perspectives, this paper compiles federalism concepts and theories used by scholars and researchers from various perspectives.

Keywords:

Federalism, Conceptual, Theoretical

Introduction

The term "federalism" was invented by the framers of the United States Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787 (Verney, 1995). Federalism then developed in the United States, which underlay the post-1789 liberal state with an emphasis on individual liberty (Verney, 1995, p. 82). Accordingly, federalism was regarded as a normative concept of human nature and social relations. Federalism is not a static phenomenon, causing its discussion to expand and be multifaceted in: politics and democracy; ethnography and sociology; government institutions

and structures; economic and fiscal responsibility; legislatures; geographical and environmental studies; history; etc. Federalism, according to Elazar (1995), is an inevitable heterogeneous field that is rather difficult to discuss satisfactorily on a conceptual and theoretical level. Although its greatest strength (in terms of federal ideas, structures, and processes stemming from them) is its adaptability or flexibility, this adaptability leads to ambiguity and creates significant conceptual and theoretical challenges. In the same line, Erk (2006, p. 105) emphasises that the lack of uniform research aims in this study has resulted in a tangled mess of definitions for federalism. Federalism has been exploited for its many and loose political applications to the point that its meaning has been distorted and rendered false. Since federalism already considers different points of view, the language has been interpreted in different ways and changed to fit the different subjects.

The Concepts of Federalism

Federalism is context-based, and context determines meaning. Given that the context of federalism is multifaceted (applied or understood differently by different people or perspectives), the next sub-topic intertwined federalism concepts written by scholars and researchers, which were then grouped to give significance to particular perspectives.

Federalism as a Normative Concept

Federalism is an essential *normative principle* of human nature and social relations. For Burgess (1993), federalism is essentially a value concept. Within a society, there are differences in ethnicity, culture, language, and religion, which has resulted in people being complex creatures. There is a basic presumption of the worth and validity of diversity, humans is complex with different needs and goal. In order to convert human purpose into human achievement, different forms of unity, collectivises forged, institutionalized, and structured organizing is needed. Due to a shortage of resources, the government is unable to fulfil all the desires of a varied community while still wishing to protect the interests of everyone from conflict and dissatisfaction. Different types of unity, collectivises formed, institutionalised, and structured organisations are required to turn person or group needs into society demands. As a method to create unity while conserving society's variety, Elazar (1982), Burgess (2006), King (1982) and Watts (2010) articulate federalism as 'diversity in unity' way.

The term "federalism" is derived from the Latin word *foedus*, which means "to be united." The term "*foedus*" refers to a societal agreement that recognises the importance of human interaction (Burgess, 2006). That means, federalism must be seen as a union of groups linked by one or more shared objectives while respecting the individual and group objectives (Friedrich, 1963). In the midst of this social upheaval, federalism frequently emphasises the notion of minorities being integrated, accommodated, conserved, and promoted within a larger political union (Zahrin et al., 2016). Federalism is developed from a variety of traits such as tolerance, respect, and mutual acknowledgment, all of which contribute to human unification and the formation of a state (Burgess, 2006).

Federalism as an Institutional Arrangement

Federalism has been referred to as the principle of institutional arrangement by most scholars (Elazar, 1987; Riker, 1964; Rosenthal & Hoefler, 1989; Bowman & Kearney, 1996; Oates, 1982). Elazar (1987) depicts federalism as an organizing principle for the territorial distribution of power, which qualifies it as 'self-rule plus shared rule' no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constituent governments at any particular time, the authority to

participate in exercising. In a similar vein, Riker (1964) refers to federalism as a mode of political organization in which the activities of government are divided between central and regional governments in such a way that each kind of government has guaranteed (constitutional) autonomy to make final decisions.

The notion of federalism is frequently regarded as sensible and the finest approximation of a level government structure. The dimensions and premise of federalism imply that several clusters are structured and governed by distinct government units, each level being separated from the other and leveraging (Rosenthal & Hoefler, 1989). This viewpoint is similar to Wheare (1967: 46) who claimed that a system of government consisting of central government, each has its own power, equality and self-governance as established in the constitution. Federalism, in other terms, expresses the concept of a state organised around the authority to work with one another.

As multilevel government system growth seems to have taken place in a difficult operation, federalism has presented the metaphors of *dual federalism* and *cooperative federalism*, which operate at a different scale, to successfully fulfil their particular functions (see Figure 1).


1. Dual Federalism

Local government are implicitly (layer cake model) or explicitly (coordinate authority model) located within the realm of state authority.

A. Layer Cake



B. Coordinate Authority



2. Cooperative Federalism

The marble cake and overlapping authority variants of cooperative federalism show that government responsibilities are shared.

A. Marble Cake



B. Overlapping Authority



Figure 1: The Metaphors of Dual Federalism and Cooperative Federalism

Source: Illustrated from Bowman and Kearney (1996) and Shah (1997).

Figure 1 demonstrates that the dual model of federalism has independent and distinctive tasks and operations by central and state governments. Therefore, central and state governments are sovereign and equal in their jurisdiction, as set out in the constitution, but the local governments are not constitutional. Under a 'layer cake' paradigm (Type 1A), the national and state governments often perform competing, non-cooperative roles, and local authorities have implicit state government control in the dual federalist coordination authority model, whose authority is expressly derived (Type 1B). Whereas the Cooperative Federalism Models regard like a marble cake (Type 2A) as equal functions or overlaps and shares responsibility on all levels (Type 2B). Decisions on a specific function will thus be taken at every government level and that the implementation of public policy is usually cooperated at all levels.

The model of *dual federalism* holds in which the responsibilities and activities of central and state government are separate and distinct. In this idea of dual federalism, the powers of the central government and the state, despite existing and being exercised inside the same territorial boundaries, are different and separate sovereignties, functioning separately and independently within their own areas. In other words, the state and national domains of jurisdiction were distinct and nonoverlapping (Shapiro, 2009). The federal government had entire power over certain matters, while the states had complete control over others. Thus, the central and state government are sovereign and equal within their respective spheres of authority as set forth in the constitution, yet the local governments do not have any constitutional status and are simply extensions of state governments. In the model so-called layer cake (with two separate flavoured layers one on top of the other), the national and state governments often assume competitive, non-cooperative roles under such an arrangement while local governments implicitly derive their authority from state governments. In the coordinate authority model of dual federalism, such authority is explicitly derived.

Whereas *cooperative federalism* indicates that all levels of government are treated as equal partners, sharing responsibilities, and solving common issues together, although the central government's supremacy over the states. This model acknowledges that overlaps do emerge when the central and state governments exercise their constitutionally-granted authorities. According to this, Oates (1982) illustrates the idea of "marble cake federalism" as the unavoidable overlap of responsibilities between the governments, comparable to the mingling of colours in a marble cake. Instead, Schapiro (2006) refers to it as "interactive federalism," which implies that both sides disregard their own limits and accept any overlap through collaboration. As for Md. Khalid (2018), cooperative federalism is a dynamic form of federalism as the central government and state powers make policies. They must find ways to solve problems that lead to duplication of jurisdiction in order to minimise the system's weaknesses, specifically through legal solutions. In this regard, decisions regarding a particular function are made at all levels of government, and all levels typically cooperate in implementing public policies.

Table 1: The Summary of Dual Federalism vs. Cooperative Federalism

Dual Federalism	Cooperative Federalism
The responsibilities of the central and state governments are separate and distinct. Both governments rule over the same land and people but have distinctive authorities and are sovereign in their own sphere. The	The responsibilities of the central and state governments are interrelated and cooperated. Both governments legislate in the same sphere and collaborate on policymaking.

central government controls national and international affairs, while the state governs the local citizens.

Both governments share authority and responsibility horizontally. Dual federalism recognises state government authorities. Even some state government powers are co-equal to the central government.

The structure of dual federalism is rigorous. This hinders the immediate and decisive resolution of complex situations.

Dual federalism promotes democratic values and prevents central government power abuse.

Dual federalism encourages state-level competition. Stronger states can intimidate poorer members in natural resource allocation.

Dual federalism is often called *layer cake* because it has different parts that work together.

As applied in Canada, India, Mexico, Malaysia, and Russia, dual federalism also involves coordinated authority. The authorities of the centre and states are coordinated, while local governments work through state governments as they have no constitutional standing.

Both governments structure of authority and responsibility is vertical. In this case, cooperation is bilateral. The line between the powers and responsibilities of the central government and the state governments is unclear.

Cooperative federalism is more adaptable and offers a more realistic approach to intergovernmental relations.

Cooperative federalism encourages collaboration but not democracy

The form of cooperative federalism is a *marble cake*. Since the colours in the marble cake are mixed, so are the functions.

Adopt in the United States, Germany, and Brazil. The central government determines the policies, while the state and local governments are responsible for implementation. Other varieties of cooperative federalism include overlapping, interdependent, and independent spheres.

Source: Summarized from Riker (1964), Oates (1982), Elazar (1987), Bowman and Kearney (1996), Schapiro (2006, 2009), and Md. Khalid (2018).

Federalism is the optimal configuration for a multilayer system of governance that is applicable to all types of government and often considered desirable. Federalism often advances expansive claim about its virtues, serves as a bulwark against tyranny and is essential for the creation and maintenance of democracy in geographically large or ethnically diverse political entities.

Federalism as a Constitution

In accordance with Wheare's concept, Kapur (1986) viewed federalism as a dual government in which power is divided and apportioned between the national and state governments by the constitution. Rodee et al., (1983:52) defined federalism as the constitutional authority exercised by national entities over their citizens. Akindele and Olaopa (2003) contended that as a federal country, a political entity or a sovereign nation would be required to make a choice in two phases or in line with a mutually agreed constitutional provision. The primary goal of federalism is not to achieve uniformity alone, but to achieve unity while maintaining variety.

According to Friedrich (1963, 1968), federalism is a bigger constitution, and the federal constitution represents a sliver of the overall process entailed by the contemporary constitution:

Federalism can be, and often has been, a highly dynamic process by which emergent composite communities have succeeded in organizing themselves by effectively institutionalising 'unity in diversity'. A conception of federalism in dynamic terms ... fits the notion of federalism as process into the notion of constitutionalism as process, and understands the relation between the inclusive community and the component communities as a system of regularized restraint upon the exercise of government power so as to make power and responsibility correlative with the structure of a composite and dynamic community, its interests and needs. (Friedrich, 1963, p. 628-529)

For Elazar (1982), they emphasized more on the importance of decision-making partnerships at the Central and State levels based on functions in each unit. In a similar tone, Riker (1964) described federalism as a means of organizing government activities by dividing autonomy between central governments and certain regions through constitutional guarantees.

Federalism as a Political Consent

The phrases "federalism," "federalist," and "federalize" have been used to denote the consolidation and preservation of political consent. Friedrich (1963) perceives federalism as a continuous and constructive political process. While other scholars view federalism as a process of democracy (Erk, 2006), participation, representation, and accountability (Elazar, 1987), or political bargaining (Riker, 1964) and influences the party system (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). Davis (1978) identifies federalism as synonymous with 44 verbs, including politics:

Dual, orthodox, classic, polis, traditional, cooperative, bargaining, integrated, interdependent, creative, new, permissive, functional, pragmatic, organic, pluralistic, monarchic, perfect, imperfect, direct, private, picket fence, coercive, competitive, centralized, decentralist, peripheralized, fused, corporate, national, social, oligarchic, unitary, constitutional, international, military, political, monistic, polar, total, partial, contract, feudal-functional and incipient. (Davis, 1978, p. 204)

Federalism fosters political participation and a sense of the democratic community, and it helps to protect basic liberties and freedom. This might be on firm ground, as Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004) have shown that federalism is established on account of political. The political justifications necessary for federalism to protect the rights of those minorities, in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or otherwise, and allow constituent units to discourage the alienation of similar tastes in public services, improve the level of welfare, and presumably a degree of satisfaction with political institutions that are unavailable to a non-federal state, are also intended to allow for the decentralisation of conflict (Filippov, Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 2004). Federalism has a great use for individuals, groups, and organisations within a society and has even exerted world-wide influence. Furthermore, federalism has a positive impact on conflict resolution (as a conflict-resolution mechanism), as an expression of democratic practises encouraging innovation in policy preferences, and as a safeguard for minorities and territorial interests (Gagnon, 1993).

Theories of Federalism

Given that there is no universally accepted definition of federalism (Ogunnoiki, 2017), theorising about it has been a challenge for the general discussion, and little focus has been put on developing theories about federalism (Paleker, 2006). Currently, there are two schools of thought that explain federalism in theory: the liberal school and the realistic school. The Liberal School was supported by 20th-century authors such as Elazar (1982, 1985, 1987, 1995, 1997), Burgess (1993, 2006), Wheare (1963), and A. Spinelli (Dosenrode, 2010, p. 12). These scholars write about federalism as a federal institution that divides power in the Constitution between the centre and other federal components or units. The realist school, on the other hand, consists of scholars like Riker (1964) and David McKay (Dosenrode, 2010, p. 15). The Realist School's federalist discourses the federalist school is at odds with the liberal school. The Realist School sees federalism in political reality and in the legal framework. According to the School of Realism, federalism stems from internal and external threats that can be military or diplomatic in nature. Federalism is a political party structure that is either centralised or divergent (decentralized). For Riker, "the structure of the party is in line with the structure of federalism." When the party is fully centralised (such as in the Soviet Union and Mexico), so is federalism. "In contrast to decentralised parties, federalism is only partially centralized" (Riker, 1975, p. 137). Of these two measures of federalism, Riker advocates centralised federalism because "peripheral federalism can hardly be expected to provide an effective government." They fall apart gradually until they become easy prey for their enemies. On the other hand, centralised federalism became more like a government or union government at the time, which helped the whole federation work better in a dangerous world (Riker, 1987, p. 11).

Based on these two schools of thought, the discourse of federalism is elaborated according to varying dimensional perspectives by scholars. From a theoretical perspective, there are four main dimensions (approaches) that can be categorised to explain federalism.

- i. **Institutions or constitutions:** Wheare explains federalism from the point of view of institutional legal theory.
- ii. **Sociology:** Livingston from the perspective of sociological theory.
- iii. **Politics:** Riker is about the theory of negotiation.
- iv. **Process:** Friedrich explains federalism in process theory or developmental theory.
(Ogunnoiki, 2017; Paleker, 2006, Birch, 1966, p.15).

According to Ogunnoiki, (2017) and Paleker (2006), federalism was classified into the following theories based on the four dimensions listed above:

i. *The Classical Theory of Federalism*

The classical theory of federalism is popular among scholars (Dicey, Brown, Bryce, Moore, Garaan, and Wheare), and the only theory included in this category is the theory of a legal institution. The legal theory of Wheare's institutions is a classic theory of federalism based on the model of American federalism. This theory of institutional law was started in the 19th century by the British constitutional lawyer (Dicey). It is considered a classical theory because it uses the traditional approach to political science, which is the institutional approach.

ii. *The Modern Theory of Federalism*

Adopts analytical and empirical methods to explain federalism. It is made up of sociological theory, political theory, and process theory.

iii. *Federalism's Origin Theory*

The origin theory of federalism explains the circumstances favourable to the establishment of a federal system. This theory of federalism consists of sociological theory, negotiation theory (bargaining), and political theory. This theory looks at the social and political factors that led to the rise of federalism.

iv. *A Functional Theory of Federalism*

Theories found in this category are institutional law theory, sociological theory, and process theory. The core of the theory is the source of power for performing functions at each level of government (central and sub-constituent). This category theory explains how federalism is used to define federation and protect society. It also explains how federalism helps government units find solutions to problems.

Table Error! No text of specified style in document.: Theories of Federalism by Dimensions

Federalism Theories	Scholar	Dimensions	Classical Theory	Modern Theory	Origin Theory	Functional Theory
Institutional Law Theory	Wheare, K.C.	Institution or Constitution	/			/
Sociological Theory	Livingston, W.S.	Sociology		/	/	/
Political Theory	Riker, W.H.	Politics		/	/	
Process Theory	Friedrich	Process		/		/

Source: Adapted from Ogunnoiki (2017) and Paleker (2006).

Institutional Law Theory of Federalism

Under the influence of classical theory, federalism is portrayed as a system that distinguishes and alienates power between the general (central) and regional governments (Bryce), each have sovereignty, coordination, and freedom within their own sphere (Garan). From the Bryce and Garan concepts, Wheare went a step further, identifying the desires of countries as a necessary condition for the formation of a federation:

It would seem that a federal government is appropriate for a group of states or communities if, at one and the same time, they desire to be united under a single independent general government for some purposes and to be organised under independent regional governments for others. Or, to put it shortly, they must desire to be united, but not unitary. (Wheare, 1963, p.36)

A decade later, Wheare (1963) referred to the constitution as a federation. A constitution can be referred to as a federation if there is a predominance of federal principles in the constitution. His use of the term “predominate” suggests that he does not apply his ideas exclusively to federations. As he says, a constitution only ceases to be federal:

If...there are so many modifications in the application of the federal principal, that it ceases to be of any significance...the most instructive and reasonable way

to use the term “federal constitution” seems, essentially, to be define the federal principle rigidly, but to apply the term “federal constitution” more widely. (Wheare, 1963, p. 15)

Wheare used the following test to figure out if a constitution was federal or not:

The test which I apply to the Federal Government is simply this. Does a system of government embody predominantly a division of power between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is coordinated with the other's and independent of them? If so, that government is federal. (Wheare, 1963, p.33)

This question led to the classic theoretical conclusion that each independent government in the police was twice for two levels of government, central and regional. Classical theorists mention several conditions in this system:

1. A written constitution.
2. The constitution is to be rigid.
3. There has to be an independent judiciary.
4. Both level government directly operate on the life of the citizen.
5. There should be allocation of adequate sources of revenue for the government at each level, general and regional.

(Paleker, 2006)

The classical theory explains federalism in juristic terms, in which a federation polity can be distinguished from a unitary where the constituent units exercise their powers in subordination to the will and discretion of the general (central) government of the whole country.

Federalism is an appropriate form of government to offer to communities or countries of distinct, differing nationalities who wish to form a common government and to behave as one people for some purpose, but wish to remain independent and, in particular, to retain their nationality in all their aspects. (Wheare, 1967, p.35)

This theory, formed on the ground of legal formalism, however, faces criticism and challenges in terms of wars and depression, economic planning, and social services that make this classical theory of federalism obsolete (Palekar, 2006). The legal-institutional theory of federalism has not proven to be a time-tested and comprehensive theory based on his view of federalism as a federal principle of dividing power between the general and regional governments as spelled out in a federal written and rigid constitution (Ogunnoiki, 2017). Further objections to the term "independent" to represent the relationship between the general and the regional government in a federal political system. "Independence" might mean being alone, but for a federal system to work, neither the central government nor the regional governments can work independently of each other (Paleker, 2006).

This theory is also not concise because a third tier of government failed to recognise such local government. This theory also failed to elaborate on some words that he used to explain the definition of federalism in strictly dividing powers between two levels of government. The method should come up with its own sphere, coordinates, and independence. For example, it is ambiguous. Livingstone criticised Wheare's legal-institutional theory of federalism because his theory ignores sociological variables or a person's federal qualities (Ogunnoiki, 2017).

According to him, typically, differences in economic interests, religion, race, nationality, language, great distance separation, differences in historical background, previous existence as independent countries or separate colonies, and dissimilarities in social and political institutions can cause diversity (Ogunnoiki, 2017; Paleker, 2006). Livingston also redefines a federal government as a form of politics and constitutional organisation that unites into a single polity a number of diversified groups or component political so that the personality and individuality of component parts are largely preserved while creating in the new totality a separate and distinct political and constitutional unit (Ogunnoiki, 2017).

Sociological Theory of Federalism

The sociology theory is one of the earliest theories of federalism, and Livingston is recognised as the first exponent of the theory. The sociological theory arose as a result of weaknesses in Wheare's legal-institutional theory, and he denied the constitutional or legal basis of federalism. According to Livingstone, federalism is not a function in terms of constitutions but sociological arrangements.

The essential nature of federalism is to be sought not in the shading of legal and constitutional terminology but in the forces-economic, social, political, and cultural-that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary. The essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in society itself. The federal government is a device by which the federative qualities of society are articulated and protected. (Livingston in Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2020, p. 82; Ogunnoiki, 2017, p. 69)

This theory centres on the federation nature of society that spawned the federal political system. A federal society is one that incorporates elements of diversity. "Diversity in economic interests, religion, race, nationality, language, great distance separation, differences in historical background, previous existence as independent countries or separate colonies, and dissimilarities in social and political institutions" (Singh & Kumar, 2016; Paleker, 2006). Livingston (1952) believes that diversity in society is one of the natures of fellowship. According to him,

if they are collected regionally or geographically, the result may be a federal society. If they are not collected on a territorial basis, society cannot be called federal. However, only in previous cases can this take the form of federalism of the federal government; in the latter case, it becomes the same functional pluralism, or form of corporatism. (Livingston, 1952, p. 23).

Livingston laid down the important condition that diversity must be territorially grouped in order to result in the formation of a federation. These differences must not be so great that they split the community into independent groups, nor should they be suppressed to make way for a unitary government system.

The sociological of Livingston, however, has been criticised:

1. The theory has merely pointed out the various kinds of diversity but has not explained the factor which generates the desire among the diversity for establishing a general government within a federal framework.
2. The theory lacks definite indices and criteria by which a federal society can be distinguished from a non-federal society. This resulted in paradoxical claims such as Wildavsky portraying the United States as a federal society and Riker's claims as

sufficiently integrated to justify federalism over a unitary system if the United States' leaders chose to do so.

3. The idea of federal society on this theory is vague and full of ambiguities, with each scholar interpreting and bearing on federalism in their own way.
4. Although Livingston's sociological theory identifies diversity in society as what necessitated the founding of a federation, this theory nevertheless falls short in making known what actually propelled these diverse nations (e.g., economic advantage, security, shared problems, etc.) to agree to the formation of a federation when they can actually opt to be an independent nation.

(Ogunnoiki, 2017; Paleker, 2006)

Political theory of Federalism

The second origin theory is the political theory of federalism. So-called bargaining theory, this theory concentrates only on countries and decision-makers, ignoring the diversity of individuals within a society as a component in theorising federalism, as sociological theory does. This political theory of federalism was founded by William H. Riker (1920-1993). Riker (1964) explained the origins of federalism as a bargain among political leaders with expansionist and militaristic concerns. Riker comes up with two "necessary" but "inadequate" conditions for the "bargain of federalism", the expansion condition and the military condition.

1. The politicians negotiating the deal want to expand their territorial control, often in response to an external military or diplomatic threat or in preparation for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandisement. Despite their desire to expand, they are unable to do so through conquest, either due to military inadequacy or an ideological stance.
2. The politicians who accept the bargain, ceding some autonomy for the sake of unification, do so in response to an external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. Either they want to be protected from a threat from outside or they want to take part in the federation's possible aggression.

(Riker, 1964)

Political leaders seeking to regain control over the government's fragmented territories in response to military or diplomatic threats are unable to do so through conquests, instead offering concessions on the independence of component territories. Riker believes that federalism is a political solution that follows the collapse of the empire or tries to develop a growing political community while preserving and protecting the sovereignty of component units (Riker, 1964).

In the modern theory of federalism, Riker also mentioned that federalism is a political organisation in which the activities of the government are divided between central and regional governments in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions. In his theory, Riker (1964) discovered that the structure of federalism is linked with the organisation of political parties. In other words, the degree of centralization in federal systems is linked to the degree of centralization among their political parties. According to him,

The federal relationship is centralised according to the degree to which the parties organised to operate the central government control the parties organised to operate the constituent governments. This amounts to asserting that variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) in the

constitutional structure of a federalism are proximately caused by variations in the degree of party centralization. (Riker, 1964)

Riker therefore describes two equilibrating features necessary for the survival of federalism:

1. centralisation, which allows the central government to exploit the advantages of a larger base for taxes and armies, and
2. maintenance of guarantees to the constituent units, which prevents the transformation of federalism into a unitary government,

He stated that the United States was a politically centralised federation system. The invention of centralised federalism in the United States is particularly highlighted with all instances of the formation of federations since 1786. Riker states that federalism is nothing more than a deal between people who want to be national leaders and people who run local governments. The goal is to combine territories so that it is easier to collect taxes and build armies.

Process Theory of Federalism

Carl Friedrich's process theory of federalism is the last, but definitely not the least, of the main ideas. Federalism, in Friedrich's (1968) views is a dynamic process of federalizing. In his words,

federalism seems to most suitable term by which to designate the process of federalizing a political community, that is to say, the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any kind of association enter into arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies and making decisions on joint problems or reversely, the process through which a hitherto unitary political community as it becomes differentiated into a number of separate and distinct political communities now separately organized become capable of working out separately and their own, those problems they no longer have in common. (Friedrich, 1963, p. 9)

Further, Friedrich (1963, p. 2). asserts that "if thus understood as the process of federalizing, it will become apparent that federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation." Friedrich continued by laying out the prerequisites for establishing federal systems (Friedrich, 1963, p. 24). A significant feature of Friedrich's centralization is its applicability to both systems conforming to Wheare's traditional formulation and confederal, unitary, and nongovernment organisations (Jinadu cited in Okhonmina, 2006). Friedrich's reformulation is especially helpful since it is less limiting than Wheare's federal instrumentalities; it manifests in a variety of political systems, including centralised, decentralised, and supranational cooperation. Friedrich recognises the need to grant autonomous authority to separatist parties under a unitary government when separatist forces exist. Jinadu (in Okhonmina, 2006, p. 202) states that the process perspective "makes us aware of the changing and evolving nature of the federal balance of power and the fact that inter-government cooperation usually cuts across the formal constitutional division of powers."

The dominating force in the political system will shape the interaction between the two levels of government. A federation formed by centripetal forces is probable. Conversely, a federation dominated by centrifugal tendencies is likely to be disaggregated. Unlike Livingston, Friedrich's sociological approach does not reject the constitutional or legal foundation of federalism (Okhonmina, 2006, p. 202). Friedrich process theory has also been criticised; theoretical propositions described federalism in broad strokes and federalism was seen as a

dynamic process, making it impossible to identify a particular time period during which a polity is claimed to be practising federalism. Burgess also said that this approach is insufficiently precise in terms of federalism.

Summary of Federalism Theories

From the description of the above theories, it can be summarized as Table 3.

Table 2: Summary of Federalism Theories

Theory	Summary
Institutional Law Theory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> distinguishes and division of power (constituent unit exercise their powers) own sovereignty, coordination, and independent/freedom written rigid constitution independent judiciary
Sociological Theory of Federalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> denied the constitutional or legal basis of federalism sociological arrangements: economic, social, political, cultural qualities of the society are articulated and protected diversity in society - territorially grouped
Political theory of Federalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> concentrates only on countries and decision-makers origins of federalism as a bargain among political leaders with expansionist and militaristic concerns politicians negotiating the deal want to expand their territorial control federalism is a political organization each government has some activities on which it makes final decisions structure of federalism is linked with the organization of political parties. degree of centralization in federal systems is linked to the degree of centralization among their political parties.
Process Theory of Federalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> variety of political systems, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - centralized, - decentralized, and - supranational cooperation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the term "federalism" has been examined from a variety of perspectives, culminating in the absence of a universally applicable definition. This paper discovered that federalism is based on a normative concept, namely, how to manage people's diversity. This diversity is directly related to the necessity of governing individuals, groups, and communities in regards to religion, culture, space (border), economy, politics, and regulations (legislation) in order to foster peace and understanding within the same boundary. This diversity allows federalism to be debated from a variety of perspectives, ultimately making this phrase multifaceted and complex. Federalism can be debated in sociological contexts, including the management of geographical barriers, fiscal federalism, and constitutional contexts. The findings were dominated, however, by federalism in the context of institutionalising the government. Indeed, the evolution of federalism terms was thought to be parallel to the

evolution of the government system, as the term "federal" is derived from a fragment of "federalism," causing these two terms to become woven together, used interchangeably, and frequently considered synonyms. Most believe it is necessary to discuss them together, despite the fact that they are distinct. Thus, this paper explicates the concept and theory of federalism in order to facilitate its application in the appropriate context and setting.

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